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NETWORK RULES
SUSAN P. CRAWFORD*
I
INTRODUCTION
Baby Bell executives and online companies have been holding a lively
debate on the Hill and in the press as to whether the Bells should be permitted
to deviate from common carriage1 models in providing “last mile” internet
access.2 A BellSouth chief technology officer told reporters that his company
should be able to charge Yahoo! for having its site load more quickly than
Google’s.3 The CEO of AT&T said, “There seems to be a mentality [on the part
of online companies] that they can put more and more through our pipes for
free. . . . We’re the ones who built the network. You cannot make that sort of
investment if you can’t make a return on the capital. They’re more than
welcome to use our networks, but if they do, they’re going to have to pay. It’s
not free.”4
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1. “Common carriage” is an ancient concept. In a nutshell, common carriage principles
“guarantee that no customer seeking service upon reasonable demand, willing and able to pay the
established price, however set, would be denied lawful use of the service or would otherwise be
discriminated against.” Eli Noam, Beyond Liberalization II: The Impending Doom of Common
Carriage,
(Columbia
Univ.
Working
Papers
Server
Project,
1994),
available
at
http://www.columbia.edu/dlc/wp/citi/citinoam11.html.
2. The last mile is the local link between a local telephone company switching facility and the
premises of a resident or customer; it is the final leg of delivering communications connectivity.
3. Jonathan Krim, Executive Wants to Charge for Web Speed, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2005, at D5.
4. Broadband Battles, THE AGE, Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.theage.com.au/news/technology/
broadband-battles/2005/12/15/1134500943128.html?page=3.
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The telcos (and cablecos and wirelesscos)5 claim that they have spent (or
plan to spend) billions on building fiber-optic networks that can carry large
amounts of data and that therefore they are entitled to give their own content
and the content of their paying partners priority.6 In the words of the Verizon
CEO, the Bells “have to make sure that [application providers] don’t sit on our
network and chew up bandwidth. We need to pay for the pipe.”7 Similarly,
another Verizon executive has said that Google is “enjoying a free lunch that
should, by any rational account, be the lunch of the facilities providers.”8
The telcos have a two-part strategy: First, they plan to prioritize their own
packets and the packets of their partners so these affiliated packets would
arrive more predictably than other packets. Second, they propose to charge
unaffiliated online-content providers (like Google or any other non-telco source
of packets) to cross their networks. In response to this, Vint Cerf, one of the
creators of TCP/IP, has called on behalf of Google for a “lightweight but
enforceable neutrality rule.”9 A group of online companies has written to
Congress claiming that “[t]he incredible potential of broadband will be severely
compromised if network operators are permitted to be the gatekeepers of the
Internet, deciding what content, applications and services succeed or fail on the
Internet.”10 Legislative activity in this area has been intense.11
In the academic realm, dissection of intellectual property policy has been a
popular pursuit for some time, and has attracted mainstream support. For the
last ten years, a great deal of scholarly energy has been devoted to exposing and
beating back ever-expanding intellectual property claims. James Boyle provided

5. Throughout this article, the telcos (a common nickname for the Baby Bells, generated when
AT&T—known familiarly as Ma Bell—settled an antitrust action against it by breaking into multiple
telecommuncations companies) are the protagonists. Cable and wireless companies have very similar
goals, and their history of vertically integrated networks (and light regulatory treatment) has left them
in a good position to claim the control over their broadband access points that the telcos seek through
legislation. Cablecos, in particular, have been the creatures of exclusive government franchises and so
have not had to engage in a great deal of competition. I propose a single regime—structural separation
for all broadband access points, whether owned by telcos, cablecos, or wirelesscos. In effect, the telcos
seek to turn the internet into a mobile-phone-walled garden with a cable system overlay (“channels” of
content). The cablecos and wirelesscos make many of the same arguments now being advanced by the
telcos.
6. Hiawatha Bray, Telecoms Want Their Products to Travel on a Faster Internet, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 13, 2005, at A1.
7. Paul Kapustka, Verizon Says Google, Microsoft Should Pay for Internet Apps,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Jan. 5, 2006, http://informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=
175801854; see also Dionne Searcey & Amy Schatz, Phone Companies Set Off a Battle over Internet
Fees, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2006, at A1 (providing a slightly different version of Seidenberg remarks).
8. Arshad Mohammed, Verizon Executive Calls for End to Google’s ‘Free Lunch,’ WASH. POST,
Feb. 7, 2006, at D1.
9. Letter from Vinton Cerf to Hon. Joe Barton, Chairman, House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, and Hon. John D. Dingell, Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy and Commerce
(Nov. 8, 2005), available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/net-neutrality/20051108google.pdf.
10. Krim, supra note 3.
11. E.g., S. 2360, 109th Cong. (2006); S. 2917, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 5417, 109th Cong. (2006)
(antitrust approach); H.R. 5273, 109th Cong. (2006); H.R. 5252, 109th Cong. (2006) (giving FCC power
to police complaints); S. 2686 Stevens (R) and Inouye (D) (FCC to do a study).

04__CRAWFORD.DOC

Spring 2007]

8/8/2007 9:18 AM

NETWORK RULES

53

an important framework for this scholarship in Software, Shamans, and
Spleens,12 and this article is written in his honor. Boyle shed light on the
information vise-tightening and enclosure, the loss of balance, and the growth in
regulated uses that has since fascinated an entire generation of legal scholars.
He revealed the rhetorical construction in the background of the expansionist
effort by showing how a “romantic author” figure was being used to paper over
otherwise irreconcilable theoretical tensions inherent in the notion of
intellectual property.13 Boyle noted that intellectual property policy was often
presented (with the aid of the “romantic author”) as a public goods problem,
for which the answer was increased incentives for private actors—when the
same policy questions could also be presented as a monopoly problem, for
which the answer would be mandating more efficient information flows leading
to overall public benefits.14 Boyle suggested that “[i]ntellectual property just
does not occupy the same position in the imagination as human rights or
environmentalism,”15 and expressed the concern that we were heading down a
path of “intellectual property rights becom[ing] the vehicle for oligopolistic
concentrations of corporate power worse than those of a cyberpunk dystopia.”16
Many writers have followed Boyle in exploring intellectual property theory and
activism, transforming what had been an academic backwater into a thriving
body of scholarship that has attracted wide notice.17
This article compares the debate between the telcos and the online
companies over broadband access regimes (often called the “network
neutrality”18 debate) to the ongoing tussle between intellectual property
maximalists and “free culture”19 advocates. These two sets of arguments are
strikingly parallel.20 The same battles are being played out again, but this time at
the fundamental level of network transport. Again, a romantic figure is being
used—this time, the romantic figure of the “network builder.”

12. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996).
13. See id. at 114 (“[T]he romantic vision of authorship plays down the importance of external
sources by emphasizing the unique genius of the author and the originality of the work.”).
14. Id. at 38.
15. Id. at 143.
16. Id. at 184.
17. For discussion of Boyle’s analysis and contribution to this debate, see infra Part III.
18. See Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 141–44 (2003) (discussing “network neutrality”).
19. E.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004).
20. Some of my colleagues have already explored the philosophical intersections between
copyright law and communications law. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Communications’ Copyright
Policy, 4 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 97 (2005) (discussing communication law’s role in
regulating creativity); Tim Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004)
(discussing copyright law’s role in regulating competition between rival disseminators); Jonathan
Weinberg, Digital TV, Copy Control, and Public Policy, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 277 (2002)
(discussing communication law’s involvement in information policy). I discussed the FCC’s role in
copyright policy in The Biology of the Broadcast Flag, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 603 (2003).
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In debates over intellectual property law, maximalists claim that creativity
comes from lone geniuses (the “romantic author”) who must be given legal
incentives to work.21 Intellectual property scholars have carefully examined the
incentives arguments made by the backers of the romantic author vision and
have pointed out that granting overly strong property rights to copyright
holders might not be socially appropriate. Because all works draw on earlier
works, because access to earlier works encourages creative innovation,22 and
because strong monopoly grants are not necessary for authorship to continue,23
overprotecting the romantic author may actually harm society as a whole.24
In the current network neutrality debate, network providers claim that they
(the romantic builders) must be allowed by law to price-discriminate vis-à-vis
content sources in order to be encouraged to build the network (or to continue
supporting it).25 It is as if a hard-hatted young builder is standing before us,
sleeves rolled up, a coil of fiber over his shoulder, muscles rippling, eager to
achieve the American dream of property ownership and all its benefits of
leases, lending, and upward mobility. If we agree with the vision of the romantic
builder and make sure he is perfectly compensated for all revenue streams
generated by “his” network, the network provider will act as a gatekeeper for
all content that reaches its subscribers, choosing winners and losers based on
ability to pay. In a nutshell, access to all communications networks will be in the
form of private cable-like systems. The romantic figure of the builder is being
used to end questions about desirable social policy that should not be dropped:
Should the rules that have made possible the explosive growth of the internet
be abandoned? Should companies with significant market power over

21. This corresponds to the “romantic author” figure in Boyle’s SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND
SPLEENS. See infra Part III.
22. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 34–36 (1991) (negative consequences for second innovators from
overprotection of first innovators).
23. See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369
(2002) (discussing this claim in the context of open source software).
24. Scholars have also noted that the creative genius (or, as Boyle terms it, the “romantic author”)
vision is factually inapposite because intellectual property rights are often assigned to intermediary
publishers or distributors. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1540 (2005). Although the current Copyright Act provides mechanisms by which
authors who have assigned their works can terminate these transfers, the rules are complicated. 17
U.S.C. §§ 203, 304 (2000).
25. See, e.g., Sonia Arrison, Nixing Net Neutrality, TECHNEWS WORLD, Aug. 25, 2006,
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/52618.html (“[A]s consumption of rich online multimedia grows,
the next-generation internet will require billions of dollars in investments to expand bandwidth
capacity. With network providers taking significant risks in response to this demand, it would be a
mistake for Congress to intervene and regulate in anticipation of problems.”); KYLE DIXON ET AL.,
THE PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUNDATION, A SKEPTIC’S PRIMER ON NET NEUTRALITY
LEGISLATION 7 (2006), http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=445 (“Net neutrality mandates
represent the forced commoditization of broadband infrastructure. Broadband providers would be
prohibited from experimenting with different network architectures that might conflict with the onesize-fits-all ‘end-to[-]end’[–]dumb pipe model. Under a net neutrality regime, the providers would have
difficulty developing innovative business models that would permit them to recoup the significant fixed
costs of building out broadband networks.”).
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broadband access be allowed to impose discriminatory pricing on sources of
content? How will this privatization of network access valves affect society as a
whole?
This article’s aim is to convince a new generation of legal scholars that
communications law (that boring province of insiders citing section numbers
and mumbling acronyms) is to the networked age as intellectual property law
was to the information age and labor law was to the industrial age. The same
energy and principled holistic approach used in re-examining intellectual
property law (“why do we have intellectual property at all?”) is now needed in
the debate over access to broadband networks.
We grant intellectual property rights in order to encourage creativity that
will eventually be available to all (and therefore temper absolute monopolies
over creative production through devices such as fair use, limited periods of
protection, the first sale doctrine, and compulsory licenses). So should
communications law lead to socially desirable results. But the romantic builder
may not have the interests of society as a whole in mind: indeed, the private
access regime sought by these network providers is likely to have socially
undesirable results. First, it will likely have a negative impact on the many other
actors online that use many inputs (not just transport) to create great social
benefits. Many of these social benefits from online innovation come in forms
other than revenue streams. As in the intellectual property debates, protecting
property prerogatives too strongly may not be worth the limitations on overall
social well-being that enforcement of these rights creates. Second, the payments
sought by the network providers bear no necessary relationship to the
“incentives” they claim they need. Indeed, the incentive claims made by the
network providers may very well be completely inaccurate—in many instances,
the network provider has already built the network, will be able to recoup its
investment by providing transport to end users, or will never actually build the
promised high-speed fiber local loops. In other words, the regime these network
providers seek is likely to harm society and will not necessarily lead to social
benefits in the form of increased innovation or better broadband penetration.
This debate is urgent because traditionally separate communications
networks devoted to broadcast, wireless, telephony, and cable are rapidly
converging. As the distinctions between these networks disappear, what might
have seemed like a request for an exception from widely applicable regulatory
treatment (“we want new private highspeed networks not to be treated like
traditional telephone networks”) may actually be an assertion of a paradigm
shift (“no network access used for communications should be subject to nondiscrimination rules”). What may have seemed initially to be an exception to
the general rule of common carriage may be transformed into the only available
reality.
We are learning that the value of the internet to society comes from many
different sources—not just from the transport of bits or the making of money by
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firms.26 We have the opportunity to create a great public benefit by requiring
network providers to make available nondiscriminatory broadband transport to
all comers. This approach, called “quarantine” by communications lawyers,27
will best support continued explosive growth of the incredible collection of
positive network externalities that is the internet.
Just as the greater level of intellectual property protection accorded content
companies has arguably had a negative effect on the health and extent of the
public domain28 and is widely viewed to be socially undesirable, the greater level
of control sought by access providers to choose online winners and losers will
likely have a negative effect on the health and diversity of the internet. By
contrast, if a quarantine rule is put in place, the resulting network will likely be
more socially valuable than the one that would have been created by giving
network providers strong property rights over access in the hope that the
resulting revenue would provide incentives to investment in the network.29
How Japan and Germany have dealt with broadband access policy may have
valuable lessons for U.S. scholars. In Japan, a strong regulator has mandated
that the incumbent open its facilities—including its fiber-optic connections—to
its competitors.30 The result has been vibrant competition, low prices, very high
speeds, very high penetration of the consumer market for broadband access,
and explosive innovation in applications and services. In Germany, a relatively
weak regulator has been unable (or unwilling) to mandate that the incumbent
monopoly telecommunications company, Deutsche Telekom (DT), open its
facilities to competitors.31 The result has been a continued monopoly by DT,
which is now poised to roll out fully integrated “interactive entertainment”
systems that will embody all of the controls and price discrimination so eagerly
sought by telcos here in the United States. Although the European Commission
has threatened to take legal action against the German government for its laxity

26. E.g., Benkler, supra note 23.
27. See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 85, 121 (2003) (“The classic and pure structural remedy [for competition failure] is a
‘“quarantine’” that forbids the platform monopolist from participating in the applications sector.”). In
the FCC’s Computer I decision, AT&T was precluded from providing applications; this was a
“quarantine” remedy. Id. at 129.
28. Key articles about the enclosure of the public domain caused by intellectual property
legislation include: Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for
Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and
Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the
Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089 (1998).
29. The risks posed by propertization of communications networks have been explored by, among
others, Yochai Benkler in Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001) (exploring effects on personal autonomy), and by Mark Lemley and
Lawrence Lessig in The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the
Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001) (exploring effects on innovation).
30. See infra Part IV.A.
31. See infra Part IV.B.
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in its dealings with DT, the incumbent is confident that its plans will receive
legislative approval.
In the United States, the market for broadband access is settling into a
comfortable oligopoly—giant telcos and cablecos gently fighting among
themselves.32 We should not expect that our current trajectory will provide
competition for broadband access leading to lower prices, higher speeds,
greater penetration, choices of unfettered access valves, and greater innovation.
We need to make sure that the form of internet access available to the United
States produces the maximum possible amount of overall social benefit, and we
cannot rely on the current marketplace for access to provide this. We have had
enough experience with a still-youthful internet to know that open,
nondiscriminatory network access—a neutral substrate over which many kinds
of private endeavors travel—is likely to produce greater social value than cablesystem-like proprietary access.
Part II of this article discusses the context in which the telco rhetoric of the
provider as romantic builder is emerging and describes how this vision is
obscuring the central policy choice that should be at the heart of the network
neutrality debate: Will open or propertized network access lead to the greatest
overall social benefit? Part III compares the network neutrality debate to the
continuing battles over intellectual property that Boyle presaged in Shamans,
Software, and Spleens. Part IV provides the comparative analysis, assessing the
Japanese and German situations. Part V provides a roadmap for future
scholarship in this area.
II
THE BATTLEFIELD
A. Deregulation and Broadband Providers
After the CEO of AT&T argued that, having built the network, the telcos
own it, the ensuing uproar caused him to backtrack and “clarify,” saying that he
had been referring only to the company’s “private internet” over which it plans
to offer its new television service, and not the “public internet.”33 The concept of
a “private internet” is central to the telco rhetoric. Some background may help.
Until very recently, the telephone companies were required to provide
telecommunications services on a common carriage basis.34 This meant that they

32. S. DEREK TURNER, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK II: THE TRUTH BEHIND AMERICA’S
DIGITAL DECLINE 19 (2006), available at http://www.freepress.net/docs/bbrc2-final.pdf (describing
regional duopolies controlled by cable and telephone providers).
33. No Action Needed Now on Net Neutrality: FCC Chief, REUTERS NEWS, Dec. 14, 2005, available
at http://in.tech.yahoo.com/051214/137/61jmv.html.
34. See ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 75–79 (1983) (discussing history of
common carriage in the United States); James B. Speta, Deregulating Telecommunications in Internet
Time, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1063, 1083 (2004); JoAnne Holman & Michael A. McGregor, The
Internet as Commons: The Issue of Access, 10 COMM. L. & POL’Y 267, 279–80 (2005) (relating that as
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could not discriminate against anyone wishing either to connect to their
network or to use their facilities to compete with them. Starting in the 1960s, the
telcos were also required to permit competitors to attach devices to these
networks, as long as the devices were certified not to cause harm to the
network.35 This open network made growth of the internet possible in the
United States because consumers could get flat-rate, dial-up internet access and
attach modems to telephone connections that allowed their computers to act
like phones. By contrast, both cable and wireless companies have been
permitted (largely) to act as private, vertically integrated networks without a
great deal of FCC regulation.36
Although telephone companies were not initially enthusiastic about acting
as internet service providers (ISPs) and connecting their subscribers to the
internet, they prospered when subscribers bought extra lines to allow them to
go online through other ISPs. The phone companies prospered again when
subscribers bought their proprietary DSL services,37 enabling internet access at
even higher speeds (one to two Mbps).38 The explosive growth of the internet
took these phone companies by surprise, however, and they became unhappy
with requirements to provide flat-rate, open access to this increasingly desirable
network. Their dissatisfaction increased when use of online voice services
(VoIP) began to undermine their traditional telephone revenues. They decided
to compete with the internet.
The telcos argued strenuously that cable companies providing internet
access should be subject to the same open access, common carriage, and
nondiscrimination provisions under which the telcos were operating. But as of
March 2002, the cable companies had obtained from the FCC the promise that
the broadband access they provided would not be regulated as a
“telecommunications service” by the FCC—so no open access obligations
early as ICC regulations created pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Act of 1897, regulations have
classified the telephone industry as a public utility and a common carrier).
35. See Kevin Werbach, The Federal Computer Commission, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2005)
(describing Carterfone history and Part 68 rules); Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the
Internet (Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n Office of Plans & Policy, Working Paper No. 31, 1999),
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf.
36. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 541(c)–(d) (2000).
37. Both dial-up and digital subscriber line (DSL) access run across traditional telephone copper
wires. See CISCO SYSTEMS, INTERNETWORKING TECHNOLOGY HANDBOOK, at 21-1,
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ito_doc/dsl.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
38. DSL devotes certain frequencies on traditional copper phone lines to data transmission and is
faster than dial-up because (in part) it does not need to go through a circuit switch but instead goes
directly to the packet-switched network. There must be a DSL modem at each end of the phone line,
which will transmit and receive all data (without conversion) as a digital signal. A subscriber’s house
must be close to the telephone office and its DSL modem. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
PUBL’N NO. GAO-06-426, TELECOMMUNICATIONS: BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT IS EXTENSIVE
THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES, BUT IT IS DIFFICULT TO ASSESS THE EXTENT OF DEPLOYMENT
GAPS IN RURAL AREAS 22 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06426.pdf [hereinafter
GAO 2006 REPORT]. DSL speeds in the United States are about 1.5 to 3 Mbps (about 50 to 100 times
the speed of a 28 bps dial-up modem), while ADSL speeds may reach 8 Mbps. Id. at 8. The FCC
defines broadband as anything over 200 Kbps, which is alarmingly slow. FCC, What Is Broadband?,
http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/broadband.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
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would be imposed on them.39 Between 2002 and 2005 the telcos switched gears
and fought hard to remove their own unbundling obligations, pointing out that
new investment in fiber networks would be stunted if they did not have control
over their networks similar to that of the cable companies. As of February 2003,
the FCC made clear that unbundling requirements would not be imposed on
new fiber to the home (FTTH) installations by the telcos, and in October 2004
the Commission eliminated unbundling obligations for fiber to the curb (FTTC)
projects.40 Immediately following the summer 2005 decision in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,41 which deferred to the
FCC’s determination that cable networks had no common carriage obligations,
the Bells demanded that DSL services be similarly released from any
requirement to connect to all ISPs or carry all services. In August 2005, they
achieved this goal with the issuance of the FCC’s Wireline DSL order.42
Now the telcos and the cablecos are aligned, for both groups have reached a
common plateau of deregulation: all unbundling and nondiscrimination
requirements have been removed from their broadband businesses by the FCC,
and these providers will no longer have to carry competing services (such as
Skype, GoogleVideo, or even competitive ISPs) at optimal speeds. The telcos
and cablecos are working very hard to get legislative language in place blessing
these FCC decisions.
B. From Deregulation to Monetization and Prioritizing
The enormous lobbying energy now being devoted to ensuring the
deregulation of broadband access in the United States is in turn part of a global
attempt by many broadband providers to turn their networks into something
much more like what cable companies and mobile phone carriers already
have—wholly monetized “services,” with vertically integrated networks built to
allow deep packet inspection and the possibility of blocking or degrading
undesirable services. The telcos plan to enable monetization and discrimination
by marking their content with priority tags that the routers in their last-mile
networks can read, thus gating the flow of all other (untagged) bits. The notion
39. See generally Inquiry Concerning Appropriate Regulation of High-Speed Access to the
Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798 (Mar. 14, 2002) (holding that cable
companies are not subject to common carriage obligations). Broadband access service provided by
cable companies is called “cable modem” service. Cable modem service, which competes directly with
DSL, uses home cable network pipes (hybrid fiber coaxial networks) that are connected to ethernet
network cards inside computers. Cable facilities are connected via high-speed links directly to the
internet.
40. Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 68
Fed. Reg. 52,276, 52,279 (Sept. 2, 2003) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51); Review of the Section 251
Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,950, 77,952 (Dec. 29,
2004).
41. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
42. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, 70 Fed.
Reg. 60,222, 60,223–25 (Oct. 17, 2005) [DSL Order] (classifying wireline broadband internet access
service (DSL) as an information service under Communications Act and thus no longer subject to
common-carrier regulations under Title II of the Communications Act).
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is that these companies can shape and prioritize traffic that flows over the
networks they control.
Other, nonaffiliated, sources of online bits (individuals as well as
companies) will not get priority for their communications unless they pay the
relevant telephone company for this value-added service.43 This is what the
CEO of AT&T meant when he talked about a “private internet,” and what
Verizon means by the tagline “It’s the Network” in its advertising.44 The
prioritized communications are being called a “private internet” by the
telephone companies, even though from consumers’ perspectives these
communications will be indistinguishable from what they thought was simply
“the internet.” What Americans mean by the word “internet” is what the telcos
would call the “public internet”—the network of user-created blogs, e-mail
transmissions, local news, community groups, and online publications—that has
motivated millions of Americans to buy broadband DSL and cable access (not
to mention second phone lines) over the last few years.
Telcos and other opponents of network neutrality contend that prioritizing
some packets over others is necessary in order to extract all possible monetary
value from the internet and so have adequate incentives to invest in broadband
access.45 Because the current batch of broadband providers has tacitly agreed
that charging sources of content for speed is an appropriate business practice,
“naked” (unprioritized) broadband service will not be available in this country.
43. This is a broad introduction to a much more nuanced story. For example, Verizon’s plans are
different from AT&T’s, and the plans of cable services may differ from the Bells. Verizon plans to have
one laser within its glass strands provide IPTV, phone, and “internet” service to homes, while a
separate laser within the same strand will provide video services from Verizon. Catherine Yang, Is
Verizon a Network Hog?, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Feb. 2, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/feb2006/tc20060202_061809.htm. Thus, if users watch IPTV or use the phone, their
“internet” speeds will be lower, and some have estimated that Verizon’s IPTV and phone services will
take up eighty percent or more of the available bandwidth. Id. AT&T plans to use a single pipe to
“pump” video, data, and “internet access service” to homes. Their video packets will be prioritized, and
data and “internet access service” packets will not be. See CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., ACCESS TO BROADBAND NETWORKS, June 29, 2006, at 11, available at
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/crs/RL33496_060629.pdf; Dave Passmore, Net Neutrality
Technical Challenges, BUS. COMM. REV., Apr. 1, 2006, available at http://www.burtongroup.com/
promo/columns/column.asp?articleid=252&employeeid=56 (“One might argue that no cable operators
(or Verizon with FIOS) are really ‘net neutral,’ since they’ve carved out dedicated bandwidth for their
video services. (An exception is AT&T/SBC, whose Project Lightspeed IPTV is limited by DSL, which
has insufficient capacity to set aside dedicated video bandwidth.)”); Posting by Cynthia Brumfield to
IPDemocracy, Ed Whitacre: No Packet Prioritization for Us (May 31, 2006, 08:57 AM),
http://www.ipdemocracy.com/archives/001612ed_whitacre_no_packet_prioritization_for_us.php (noting
self-contradictory statements by AT&T Chairman Ed Whitacre). Comcast plans to have “internet
access” share a single pipe with (now) analog video and, later, digital video services. See Ellen Lee,
Comcast Expands System Upgrade, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Dec. 28, 2006, available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/12/28/BUGMHN7V201.DTL. But the overall
“shaping” and “prioritizing” point is true for all of the large incumbent providers of broadband services
in the United States.
44. E.g., America’s Most Reliable Wireless Network, http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/
bestNetwork/itsthenetwork.jsp (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
45. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2005);
Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A
Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 65 (2004).
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Cable and telephone companies are simply not competing for the right to
provide unfettered, un-monetized internet access. Nor are any of these players
enthusiastic about allowing individuals and companies to upload materials at
the same speeds at which they can download.46 This asymmetry between
uploading and downloading further constrains business and individual sources
of content from publishing their own material and privileges the network
providers’ content source partners whose material will be made available by the
network provider itself.
C. Competition and Incentives
Broadband access providers in the United States face very little
competition. More than ninety-five percent of residential broadband access in
the United States is provided by either cable modem or DSL connection, with
about sixty percent of broadband subscribed households using cable service,
and thirty-six percent using DSL.47 The median number of broadband providers
for each household is two—essentially, most U.S. households have a choice of
either a cable modem service or a DSL service.48 About a third of the nation’s
households subscribe to broadband service.49 Thus, the U.S. market for
broadband access is essentially a duopoly, with most Americans having a choice
of either a cable modem or DSL connection.

46. Large telephone-company and cable company broadband access services uniformly throttle
uploading speeds, and all plan to continue doing so. For example, AT&T claims a 20 Mbps download
speed for its Lightspeed service, but will provide only 1 Mbps for uploading; Verizon claims a 30 Mbps
download speed for the top bracket of FiOS, but will provide only 5 Mbps for uploading; and Comcast
claims a 6 Mbps download speed for its basic service but provides only 384K for uploading. Marguerite
Reardon, Ups and Downs of Consumer Broadband, CNET NEWS.COM, Aug. 1, 2005,
http://news.com.com/Ups+and+downs+of+consumer+broadband/2100-1034_3-5810534.html.
47. See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV., FED. COMMC’NS COMM., HIGH-SPEED SERVICES FOR
INTERNET ACCESS: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2006, at 3 (2007), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-270128A1.pdf (“Of the 50.4 million lines that
were faster than 200 kbps in both directions, 45.9 million lines were designed to serve primarily
residential end users. Of these, cable modem represented 59.9% while 35.8% were ADSL, 0.2% were
SDSL or traditional wireline, 1.0% were fiber to the end user premises, and 3.2% used other
technologies.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: ENTERING THE BROADBAND
AGE 1 (2004) (reporting that twenty percent of households had broadband service). But see GAO 2006
REPORT, supra note 38, at 12 (finding that about half of broadband subscribers used cable and half used
DSL). In May 2006, GAO found that the FCC’s figures as to the availability of broadband to residences
were inaccurate because (1) the FCC’s data-collection procedures allowed providers to claim an entire
zip code as “covered” even if only a single business (and no residences) was actually served in that zip
code, and (2) competitors using the same “unbundled” infrastructure in a particular location were
counted, even though “several reporting providers could be relying on the same infrastructure, owned
by the incumbent telephone company, to provide access.” Id. at 16–17. Thus, the GAO found, even
though only seventy-seven percent of households in Kentucky actually had broadband access available
at the end of 2004, the FCC’s data for the same time period would show that ninety-nine of households
in Kentucky lived in zip codes with broadband service. Id. Also, the FCC counts any access faster than
200 kbps as “broadband,” even though such a slow speed does not allow for easy graphical web
searching or downloading. See What is Broadband?, supra note 38.
48. GAO 2006 REPORT, supra note 38, at 18.
49. Id. at 10 (using data as of 2005).
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The nation’s desire for greater broadband penetration has been a source of
support for the telcos’ efforts to have control over their networks. Yet the
United States is falling behind in ensuring that its citizens have high-speed
access to the internet. Studies by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) have found that the United States is either twelfth or twenty-first in the
world in the percentage of people having broadband access to the internet.50
And broadband speeds in other countries are often four to five—or even ten or
one hundred—times higher than they are in the United States.51
Optical fiber to the home is not yet widely deployed in the United States,52
and this broadband technology (along with others, such as broadband over
power lines and WiMAX53) may hold the potential to increase broadband
penetration.
The network providers argue that the market for broadband access is
sufficiently competitive. They also assert that unless they have control over who
has access to their fiber networks, they will have no incentives to install,
maintain, or improve those networks and thus improve the standing of the
United States in the race to hook up citizens to the high-speed internet.54

50. Elizabeth Wasserman, The New Telecom Wars: Looking to Update a Landmark Law, CQ
WKLY., Nov. 14, 2005, at 3049, 3052; Richard Hoffman, When It Comes to Broadband, U.S. Plays
Follow the Leader, INFORMATIONWEEK, Feb. 15, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/story/
showArticle.jhtml?articleID=197006038.
51. “Internet services in South Korea, Japan and Italy can transfer data at 8 to 10 megabits per
second and are delivering sophisticated interactive games, online video and television programs to
subscribers. In the United States, cable users can download information from the Internet at about 3 to
6 megabits per second; DSL users typically are limited to about 1.5 megabits per second.” Wasserman,
supra note 50. Japan is providing symmetric speeds in excess of 100 Mbps to consumers. Hoffman,
supra note 50 (“Most current U.S. customers are lucky to get one-tenth or even one one-hundredth of
that speed, particularly for uploads—and they pay more for the lower speed.”).
52. Only one percent to two percent of U.S. broadband users report having fiber access. HIGHSPEED SERVICES FOR INTERNET ACCESS, supra note 47, at 2.
53. Data can be sent over power lines that bring electricity into houses (“broadband over power
line,” or BPL), and plans are proceeding in Texas to do this. Steve Donohue, Powerline Outfit’s Talking
Triple Play; Firm Backed by Google, Malone to Light Up in Texas, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 2,
2006, at 10. Satellite broadband is very expensive, but continues to be discussed as an alternative. Teles
MD Has High Hopes for U.K. Satellite Broadband Offering, SATELLITE NEWS, Aug. 15, 2005. WiMax
is a wireless networking standard that can transfer data over a distance of about thirty miles, but may
not work well in crowded cities nor be able to compete effectively with enormously popular ordinary
wifi access. Dave Bailey, Is WiMax on Course for Success?, IT WEEK, Apr. 14, 2005,
http://www.itweek.co.uk/itweek/analysis/2087395/report-wimax-course-success. Community wireless
mesh networks (with a single connection to the internet shared by multiple devices) are coming into
use. Jason Meyers, The 2006 Wireless Industry Technology Preview, WIRELESS REV., Nov. 1, 2005,
http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/WirelessReview/2005/11/01/1069954 (citing analyst report claiming
that the market for wireless mesh infrastructure will be worth $974 million by 2009). At the moment,
however, none of these alternative routes is a realistic competitor to telco broadband access.
54. So the network providers argue that the quid pro quo for improving the U.S. broadband story
should be control over their networks and the ability to force competing services to compensate the
network manager for “prioritized” carriage. Verso is already providing Skype-blocking software to
network providers. Ted Shelton, Verso Appliance Lets Enterprises Block Skype, INFORMATIONWEEK,
Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=171000619.
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Telephone and cable company officials often begin speeches about their
companies’ ownership of the network with a claim as to how much they have
spent building it. Comcast claims to have spent $100 billion.55 Verizon claims to
have invested $15 billion in building its FiOS service.56 AT&T57 claims to have
spent $5 to $6 billion on its Project Lightspeed fiber-optic network.58 All three
companies have said publicly that in order to recoup this investment they will
need to be able to monetize their networks.59
There is little hope that real competition for unfettered internet access (both
up and down) will emerge, given the deeply entrenched nature of the
extraordinarily large telcos60 and cablecos, the very high up-front costs of
creating an alternate broadband access route, and the need to obtain municipal
rights-of-way to reach consumers’ homes. In the meantime, the old copper wires
that were required to serve as common carriage platforms in the past, with their
nondiscriminatory dial-up or DSL access to ISPs and thence to the internet, are

55. Joseph W. Waz, Jr., Vice President, Comcast, Keynote Remarks at the Broadband Policy
Summit (May 10, 2006), available at http://www.ncta.com/DocumentBinary.aspx?id=357.
56. Justin Fox, The Broadband War of 2006, FORTUNE, Apr. 3, 2006, available at
http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/21/technology/pluggedin_fortune/index.htm.
57. Formerly SBC.
58. Keith Reidat, AT&T Rolls Out Lodi Plan: Lightspeed, Though, May Be Subject to Fee, THE
RECORD, Dec. 31, 2005, available at http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2005/dec/1250476.htm.
59. The leading non-corporate voices in support of this claim are well respected and extremely
able. Adam Thierer of the Progress and Freedom Foundation, for example, has often said that vertical
integration of network pipes with higher layers of the protocol stack will both lead to more robust
competition for the provision of broadband access and ensure that consumers have a wide array of
service choices. E.g., Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipes” Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net
Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275 (2005). Others
have noted that network managers’ ability to manage congestion will bring great economic benefits to
consumers who are not themselves high-bandwidth users. See, e.g., Christopher Yoo, Network
Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1853–54 (2006) (“[P]rohibiting last-mile
providers from deviating from network neutrality may actually harm consumers. Simply put, the
current regime of flat-rate pricing and unrestricted access discourages innovation in network
management.”); James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access
Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 76–88 (2000) (suggesting that open-access
rules may be harmful and that consumer demand for broadband access platforms will force providers to
make available open networks); Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71
U. COLO. L. REV. 819, 832–37 (2000) (suggesting limited regulation). Barbara van Schewick has sharply
questioned the economic assumptions of some network neutrality opponents in Towards an Economic
Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329 (arguing that
potential for discriminatory activities by network providers is greater than commonly assumed).
60. Of the seven Baby Bells formed after the breakup of Ma Bell in 1984, only four remain. The
old AT&T, Southwestern Bell, Ameritech, SNET, Pacific Bell, and BellSouth are now collectively
“AT&T.” Similarly, GTE, Nynex, Bell Atlantic, and MCI have joined together to form Verizon. Two
Baby Bells, the new AT&T and Verizon, control telco access around the country. According to TNS
Telecom, the post-BellSouth merger with AT&T will result in control of twenty-two percent of all
consumer dollars spent on telecom services (including video services) and thirty-four percent of dollars
spent in the business market. Press Release, TNS Telecoms, Combined AT&T/Bellsouth Will Control
22%
Consumer
Telecom
Spending,
34%
Business
Spending
(Mar.
13,
2006),
http://www.tnstelecoms.com/press-3-13-06.html. After the deal is closed, three of the nation’s top
telecom providers—AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast—“will control 49% of the total consumer market
and in the business market AT&T and Verizon will represent 55% of spending.” Id. In effect, the
industry is re-monopolizing.
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being taken out of service.61 End users will have no choice but to sign up to
whatever limitations the providers of fiber decide make sense.62 Competitive
ISPs who used dial-up or DSL connections provided by the telcos to sell
services to their customers are going out of business. And the telcos and
cablecos are fighting the creation of government-owned networks that might
provide unfettered broadband connections to the internet at lower rates.63
The telcos’ interests here align with those of several other incumbents who
would welcome private-access privileges to attain their own goals. Perfectly
tracked communications—the same routers that know to speed a first-run
movie along its way will also know who is watching that movie, and from what
chair—ease law enforcement’s surveillance tasks. Hollywood would also like to
know who is watching what movie and whether the right license fee has been
paid.
Nondiscriminatory communications make law enforcement feel itself to be
at risk because online communications are not necessarily authenticated in any
way that is familiar to them. It puts Hollywood at risk because user-created
content, including video as well as text, is becoming extremely popular online.
Users are competing with content providers in a way they have not before. The
telcos are at risk because free VoIP services are undermining their revenues. A
long list of fears of the internet, supported by constant negative mass-media
articles, provides justifications for these incumbents’ desires and, in turn, for the
notion that all access should be carefully monitored and paid for. All these fears
would be assuaged by chokepoints that would be created by Congress’s blessing
the rhetoric of the romantic builder and legalizing the telcos’ dominion over
“their” networks.
Because broadcast, telephony, cable, and wireless networks all increasingly
use Internet Protocol (IP) packet-switching technologies, these formerly
separate networks are merging into one. The winner in the contest to provide
broadband access to this network to consumers will either be the telcos and
cablecos (using fiber to the home) or the wireless companies (using wireless

61. See Verizon Internet Access Service Terms of Service, § 8.4, http://www.verizon.net/policies/
popups/tos_popup.asp (“Conversion from DSL Service to Verizon Fios Internet Service. At such time
as Verizon is able to provision the Service utilizing fiber optic technologies, we may in our discretion
terminate your DSL Service and no longer make DSL service available to your location. In cases of
such termination, we will offer to you Verizon Fios Internet Service and we will disclose to you
applicable rates and additional terms, if any, and such rates and terms may differ from the DSL
Services provided under this Agreement.”).
62. Verizon already outlaws hosting servers, id. § 3.6.5, and also blocks ports that are used for
incoming requests for web pages and services. The FiOS service includes a clause stating that if a
subscriber abandons Verizon’s local phone service, Verizon may in its discretion terminate the FiOS
service. Id. § 8.3. Furthermore, Verizon’s Terms of Service do not guarantee internet access. Id. § 15.2.
It can be expected that other forms of discrimination against user-created content or content that has
not paid for access to Verizon’s subscribers will be put in place when the legal status of Verizon’s
service is clearer.
63. Jesse Drucker & Li Yuan, Hostile Reception: Phone Giants are Lobbying Hard to Block Towns’
Wireless Plans, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2005, at A1; Jonathan Krim, Fast Internet Service for the People;
Telecoms Fight Plans for Public Networks, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2004, at A01.
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bandwidth to reach the home and fiber connectivity on the backbones).64 In
either case, all these actors want to be in charge of vertically integrated, privateaccess regimes—and many of them have significant market power.
There is nothing wrong with making money from private property. If a telco
or cableco were merely charging for access to the movies it owned, the network
neutrality controversy would never have arisen. The problem is that there is
little or no competition in the market for broadband access, and the telcos or
cablecos are planning to leverage their power over transport into power over
content.
Nor is the network neutrality battle just about who gets to collect rents for
streaming video services. It is also about the environment that will result. First,
if a telco makes an exclusive deal with any high-speed application source,
agreeing to prioritize its packets, then any other source will be second-best and
may fail. Second, new businesses and individuals with ideas for new online
interactions may not be able to pay for any of these value-added services. Thus,
the risks to as-yet-unborn technologies and interactions may be great. They may
never be discovered and may never attract investment because they will not be
accessible at the high speeds their use requires. Third, the telcos seek to
internalize the positive externalities of the internet, but they cannot adequately
express social demand for access and activities online.65
The rhetoric of the “romantic builder” has enormous power in the United
States. Mere network users feel uncomfortable second-guessing Verizon’s
business plans for “its” broadband access loops. But the romantic vision of the
network builder so successfully conveyed by the network operators papers over
the central communications policy question: is it better for society for access to
the converged communications network to be privatized and discriminatory?
Many more questions follow from this central one: How will discriminatory
access affect the U.S. economy and civil life? What should the role of
government be? A comparison of analogous intellectual property battles may
provide some clues.

64. The cable, telco, and wireless industries have formed a united front against the imposition of
non-discrimination rules on broadband access. See Steve Largent, President and CEO, CTIA-The
Wireless Association, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp. 5 (May
18, 2006), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/largent051806.pdf (“The wireless
industry is very concerned that the proposed Net Neutrality regulations being contemplated will drive
away the investment the industry needs to continue building the infrastructure, design the devices and
operate the evolving networks needed to sustain consumer demand for more advanced mobile services.
The industry is also concerned that many of the unintended consequences that would flow from some
of the Net Neutrality regulations being considered would have a particularly negative impact on
wireless consumers.”); All Things Considered: Internet Debate: Preserving User Parity (NPR radio
broadcast Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5362403:
(“Companies that have spent money and have not been rewarded by Wall Street . . . . [like cable]
allow[] companies like Google to thrive. . . . Let’s say someone wanted to get a broadband delivery of a
wedding. Companies should be able to charge for this.” (statement by Dan Brenner of the National
Cable Television Association)).
65. See Part III, infra.
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III
COMPARING BATTLES
In Shamans, Software, and Spleens, Boyle revealed that belief in a creative
genius—the “romantic author”—was driving society towards a series of
missteps—awarding too many property rights to the wrong people in a manner
that dramatically undervalued the interests of both the sources of and audiences
for information. Arguably, the same series of missteps is now being urged by
network providers (the telcos, cablecos, and wirelesscos in the guise of the
network’s genius creators) in the network neutrality debate.
A. Intellectual Property Missteps
Information issues, Boyle wrote, could be viewed either as potential
monopoly problems, for which the solution would be to make sure more
information was available, or as public goods problems, for which the solution
would be to enable the producers of information to commodify it so they had
ample incentives to produce it.66 He focused on the tensions inherent in these
views of information, noting that there is no principled way to determine when
one is on the potential monopoly side of the equation (requiring the disclosure
of more information to make markets work better) or the “need for incentives”
side (requiring the commodification of more information to make markets work
better). In his view, economic analysis of information policy questions was
inherently suspect because of this central indeterminacy.67 And this
indeterminacy was being covered up by a reliance on the romantic vision of the
“author.” Boyle noted that the idea of the romantic author was a relatively
recent innovation, stemming from the late eighteenth century:
As authors ceased to think of themselves as either craftsmen, gentlemen, or
amanuenses for the Divine spirit, a recognizably different more romantic vision of
authorship began to emerge. . . . The romantic author was defined not by the mastery
of a prior set of rules, but instead by the transformation of genre, the revision of form.
68
Originality became the watchword of artistry and the warrant for property rights.

The originality, spirit, and imagination of this romantic author became the
justification for reposing property rights in him and provided a method by
which the central indeterminacy of information policy could be papered over:
only original expression would be protected (thus rewarding the originality of
the author), but everything not original to the author would remain public (thus
avoiding the monopoly problem). Additionally, once information policy
questions were viewed through the lens of needing to reward a creative and
little-recognized author, the “need for incentives” side of the equation, and the
concern for commodification that would assist property owners, dominated. On
Boyle’s account, this concern for the “author” permeates information policy,

66. BOYLE, supra note 12, at 31, 36, 40.
67. Id. at 41.
68. Id. at 54.

04__CRAWFORD.DOC

Spring 2007]

8/8/2007 9:18 AM

NETWORK RULES

67

even in areas far afield from traditional “authorship” (like ownership of
spleens, or regulation of insider trading).69
For Boyle, our implicit and often unconscious reliance on the figure of the
romantic author leads inevitably to a number of missteps. In Shamans,
Software, and Spleens, he examined a series of situations—biotechnology,
copying of materials for classroom use, and software—demonstrating that
concern for the romantic author appeared to be resulting in a diminution of the
public domain on an international scale. Too many property rights were being
created, in his view, and they were impinging on traditionally public resources.
At the same time, indigenous sources for many claims of intellectual
property were being ignored. Traditional knowledge was being used as fodder
for sweeping patent claims by biotech companies, and such cultural expression
as dances and artifacts in developing nations were left unprotected by
intellectual property rights. Trade negotiators, meanwhile, were contending that
the greater the intellectual property protection provided by a developing
nation, the more attractive that nation would appear for investment by
established firms.70 Boyle noted that all works draw on prior works; insisting on
maximalist interpretations of intellectual property would undermine the
abilities of second innovators, or later authors, to build on what had come
before. Additionally, because intellectual property rights are often assigned to
publishers or distributors that can have a chokehold on the flow of information,
the romantic author vision may be completely inaccurate.71 In Boyle’s words,
“An author-centered regime can actually slow down scientific progress,
diminish the opportunities for creativity, and curtail the availability of new
products.”72 In effect, the tradeoff for all the unfairness of maximal intellectual
property protection appears to be inefficiency rather than efficiency—all in the
name of protecting the romantic author.73
B. Communications Policy Missteps
Just as Boyle found that intellectual property advocates use the “romantic
author” figure to promote expansionist arguments, network providers are
beginning to use the “romantic builder” (who needs incentives to continue to
build this resource) in an attempt to shape communications law. As with
intellectual property policy, reliance on this romantic figure leads to the
creation of too many property rights awarded to the wrong people and will tend
to both systematically ignore the contributions and needs of the internet’s
indigenous people—users—and the social value created by their use of the
69. Id. at 58.
70. Id. at 124.
71. See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1331, 1339 (2004) (“[R]ushing to protect the romantic author often serves to promote the
interests of corporate owners of intellectual property rather than the individual artists, authors, and
creators themselves.”).
72. BOYLE, supra note 12, at 119.
73. Id. at 140–41.
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internet. The claim that particular incentives are needed to encourage this
romantic figure is just as mysterious in the telecom setting as in the intellectual
property context.
1. Rewarding the Wrong People
The network providers plan to provide a “private internet” in the form of
local access loops that prioritize bits. This “private internet” will also include
“public” internet access in the form of best-efforts transmissions of nonprioritized content to subscribers. But from a subscribers’ perspective, the
private internets and the public internet will arguably be indistinguishable.
Subscribers will likely continue to see and interact with a communications
network in their homes that they will call “the internet.”74
From the perspective of the network provider, this communications network
is no more than a transport mechanism—a set of privately owned wires and
cables that stretches across the world.75 The providers’ simple calculation is that
they are entitled to a cut of all transactions that use their broadband access
connection to this transport mechanism. They plan to charge subscribers flat
fees for broadband access and content sources fees for reaching these
subscribers across this local broadband access loop at the highest available
speed. In other words, they plan to discriminate against applications that do not
pay for speedy passage across their access connections.
The providers’ argument is facially appealing: if you build something, and it
is your private property, you should be able to make money from it. But the
reality is that the telcos (or the cablecos or wirelesscos) did not create the entire
value of “the internet,” and it is “the internet” that their subscribers want to
access. Allowing these access providers to take a cut of all profits generated by
those sources of content that reach their subscribers would arguably be
rewarding the wrong people.
Although the providers do not share this view, the engineers who designed
the internet know that it is nothing but an agreement to interconnect and to use

74. This is a prediction based on the assumption that consumers will have a single communications
pipe into their home that they will use to access interactive communications that have for the last ten
years been part of what is commonly called “the internet.”
75. See, e.g., Mike McCurry, Hostile Commentary and Net Neutrality, HUFFINGTON POST, May 1,
2006, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-mccurry/hostile-commentary-and-ne_b_20179.html (“The
internet is not a free public good. It is a bunch of wires and switches and connections and pipes and it is
creaky.”); see generally Susan P. Crawford, Internet Think, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=962596 (describing mindsets of telco
incumbents, engineers, and internet futurists). Note that although private companies have invested in
the wires and the cables necessary to reach the thicker wires and cables that make up the backbone of
the internet, much if not all of this investment has been heavily subsidized by regulatory agreements
and end-user fees. And the right to use public “rights of way,” or physical key connection points under
the control of local authorities, is not owned by the carriers. Indeed, carriers own only two percent of
the land they use to provide internet access to houses. Thus, even the argument that the telcos “own”
the transport substrate is contestable and will require thorough investigation that is beyond the scope of
this article.

04__CRAWFORD.DOC

Spring 2007]

8/8/2007 9:18 AM

NETWORK RULES

69

a common protocol and naming system.76 “The internet” is the ever-expanding
set of standards and relationships that are possible using the graphical,
networked screen. No permission is needed to use these standards or to
participate in building relationships using these standards. Any device can
“connect” to the internet if it can use the TCP/IP protocol and has access to
some form of transport. But the internet works with any form of transport. The
transport needed to implement these interconnection, protocol, and naming
agreements is nothing more than that—transport, or carriage, via any form of
medium, from one node to another. On this view, what the telcos and their
analogues own is “transport,” but not “the internet.”
By any measure, the value created by the standards and relationships of the
internet bears little relationship to the characteristics of the transport valve
through which access to these standards and relationships is obtained. Because
the internet is an open set of agreements that anyone can join, it permits and
encourages collaboration and interactivity that benefits society.77 It is much
more than wires and cables; instead, it is a complex environment in which the
actions of a billion autonomous human beings are constantly creating persistent,
nonlinear forms of order and creativity. These organisms, developments, or
forms are what users want to reach.78
The telcos and cablecos have not created successful online businesses or any
notable innovations associated with online life. Indeed, the telcos in particular
have resisted the incursions of the internet since the outset. AT&T resisted the
advent of the 56K modem and had to be forced to adopt it by the Department
of Defense. The telcos complained about dial-up traffic and resisted DSL
installation. Now they have moved on to derail municipal broadband access
efforts. They have never been happy that they cannot bill separately for online
“services” to which the public has access. The telcos and cablecos would like to

76. Who “owns” the agreement to interconnect and to use a common protocol? Who “owns” the
domain name system (DNS)? No one and everyone. These are all within a kind of “network public
domain”—a commons available to all to use. No telephone company or cable company could claim to
own these affordances.
77. See, e.g., Lee Rainie, Director, Pew Internet & American Life Project, Speech to ThinkTank06
at Seton Hall University: How the Internet is Changing Consumer Behavior and Expectations (June 7,
2006) (transcript available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ppt/2006%20-%206.7.06%20ThinkTank%20
Seton%20Hall.pdf).
78. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 579 (2000). See generally
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD
(2001). Users are increasingly producing their own “content,” and this trend will undoubtedly continue.
Thus, individuals are “sources” for online value that may be affected by the prioritization and uploadthrottling practices of broadband access providers. Because we have been moving at a crawl online in
comparison with Asian countries, and because we have experienced only the services presently
commonly available on the internet, we have no idea what other user-generated experiences might be
possible with an unfettered high-speed connection. Our current telcos are not likely to be sources of
this innovation because they do not believe that expanding demand for the internet will lead to higher
profits. Thus, they are unlikely to follow internet strategies that lower costs or generate new
applications. They are instead convinced that letting the internet evolve naturally would lead to
application providers, such as Google, capturing all the benefits.
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be in the “content” business, which they see as pumping their partners’
television programs through a fast lane of their pipes to consumers, and
charging nonaffiliates to similarly reach those consumers. They are indifferent
to the reality that much of what is happening online is being created by end
users themselves: homemade video, text, and interactions of all kinds.
There is nothing wrong with charging a price for a service, and in a perfect
marketplace, every price reflects the overall value that a service provides. But
the U.S. marketplace for broadband access is far from perfect. Instead, what the
network providers have is a distribution chokehold stemming from their control
over physical access to the network. If all the providers wanted was to be paid
back for building this set of access points and if they had proposed a predictable
mechanism to make this repayment possible (without forcing consumers to buy
the new propertized thing by disabling the old common carriage access points),
the network neutrality fight would not have happened. The key difference here
is that the transport providers would like to charge fees that correspond to the
value of the communication transported to their subscribers. In light of their
market power, this is a naked holdup. They are using their controlled
distribution channel to capture returns that come from value they have not
created.
In a nutshell, the providers’ claim is not merely that they own their
networks, but also that their ownership dictates their participation in whatever
profits flow from use of their broadband access points.79 But to reward these
actors by allowing them to optimize these access valves for billing purposes
would reward the wrong people.

79. In an 1890 article that launched privacy law in the United States, Samuel D. Warren and Louis
D. Brandeis said, “The possibility of future profits is not a right of property which the law ordinarily
recognizes . . . .” The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 204 (1890). These authors were trying to
persuade their readers of the existence of a general right in individuals to be let alone. They did not
think this right to be let alone was a property right, because (in part) they did not believe that the
concept of property was broad enough to cover privacy. For example, if true but private facts were
published about a man and that publication made his life difficult (or ruined him), Warren and
Brandeis felt that property law would not necessarily protect him—because “the possibility of future
profits is not a right of property which the law ordinarily recognizes.” Id. We now live in an era in
which possessors of things they believe to be their “property” fervently believe that law protects their
possibility of future profits gained from any exploitation of that property. One example is the
continuing kerfuffle over Google Book Search, in which publishers are horrified that someone else may
someday make money from the books the publishers sold in the past. See Google, Google Book Search:
Legal Analysis, http://books.google.com/googlebooks/newsviews/legal.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
The publishers believe that they should get a cut of all possible future revenue streams that others
create based on these books and that courts and judges should act immediately to enjoin any activities
that might not fit with this model—whether or not existing fair-use case law would support their claims.
The ongoing fight over tiered internet access analyzed in this article is very similar—the broadband
providers are horrified that someone else may someday make money from applications crossing their
broadband access points. The network builders fervently believe that they should get a cut of the
revenue streams others will create if those others seek to reach their subscribers and that the legislature
should act immediately to bless their vision of the future. We do not (usually) protect existing business
models with statutes or caselaw. See Crawford, supra note 20 (discussing content-industry efforts to use
FCC rules to shield their existing business model from competition).
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2. Creating Too Many Property Rights
The broadband access debate can be seen as a contest between concern over
monopoly control of access (the network neutrality argument) and concern
over insufficient commoditization of access (the network provider argument).
The rhetoric of the romantic builder leads to support for the commoditization
point of view. But in the broadband world, even more clearly than in the world
of intellectual property, the reality of market dominance should be understood
and revealed. Current U.S. broadband providers come in only two flavors:
telcos and cablecos. The vast majority of U.S. consumers have at most two
choices of broadband provider, wherever they are, and competition between
these providers is not intense.80 Prices have stayed high and speeds have stayed
low. In both industries, consolidation is very common.81 In effect, the industry is
re-monopolizing.
What the telcos want is to have property rights in their access networks. But
in the current context, in which the access providers have significant existing
market power and are sometimes in a position of actual monopoly where they
operate,82 to create such additional property rights would merely intensify the
monopoly problem to which the 1996 Telecommunications Act was addressed.83
In the case of intellectual property, use of the rhetorical romantic author
figure underscores the notion that there is a distinction between idea and
expression, and that only the expression (the romantic material of authorship)
is controlled by an “owner.” (This distinction quickly falls apart when any close
case is considered, but it at least bears a principled relationship to the role of
the romantic author.) Unlike the romantic author figure, however, the romantic
builder does not assist in any line-drawing between owned and unowned,
between monopoly and its avoidance. He owns (or controls) everything
associated with his broadband access points. Thus, to create additional property
rights to reward this romantic actor in the manner requested by the telcos
(through sharing in the value of all communications that cross his broadband
access points) is likely to be primarily destructive. The builder should be
rewarded for providing transport, to be sure. But to do more than this will make

80. See supra Part II.
81. See supra note 60.
82. Broadband access providers have significant market power in most parts of the country, have
dominant power in others, and are monopolies in the rest. See supra note 48 and accompanying text
(noting a median of two providers per household); see also TURNER, supra note 32, at 19 (noting that
the U.S. broadband market is dominated by regional duopolies and little competition).
83. The 1996 Act required incumbent phone companies to make elements of their networks
available to competitive local phone companies. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000). These “element”
calculations were easily gamed by the incumbents, who successfully avoided competition in most cases.
The 1996 Act requirements are widely agreed to have failed in their purpose. See, e.g., Gene
Kimmelman et. al, The Failure of Competition Under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 58 FED. COMM.
L.J. 511 (2006); CONSUMER FED’N OF AM. & CONSUMERS UNION, LESSONS FROM 1996
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT: DEREGULATION BEFORE MEANINGFUL COMPETITION (2000),
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/lesson.pdf.
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clear only that communications law serves monopolists and disserves the forces
of competition.
3. Systematically Ignoring Contributions of Indigenous Peoples
Taking the (counterfactual) baseline view that what end users want is
passively to watch movies online, the network access providers move to the
assumption that greater monetization of online old-media-company movies and
television will lead to greater investment in this “content” and thus to greater
incentives to produce it, resulting in improvements in general welfare.
Alternatively, the network providers seek to make arrangements with
aggregators of user-generated material allowing them to take a piece of the
revenue generated when they transmit it to end users. These alternative
approaches systematically seek to both ignore and capitalize on the usergenerated material that is prevalent online. Just as the biotech companies
described by Boyle took advantage of traditional knowledge and decentralized
action to create a revenue stream, so the access providers would like to take
advantage of what is being created online and to find some way to make it
profitable. At the same time, they claim that only their packaging of this
material, their selection and culling of it, and their presentation of mainstream
movies and television, will have value to broadband access subscribers as
“content.”
It may go too far to assert that the standards and relationships that make up
the internet are equivalent to a developing nation likely to be abused by the
dominant network access providers. But the internet is certainly changing and
growing—certainly “developing” in that literal sense. And the network access
providers’ public campaign alternately ignores indigenous sources of
information (“nothing happened online until we started broadcasting television
there”) and seeks to monetize otherwise free sources of information for its own
purposes. In an odd echo of trade negotiators speaking of adoption of
intellectual property regimes by developing nations,84 the telcos and cablecos
assert that the internet will never reach its potential unless broadband access to
it is commoditized in the way they suggest.85 Their reluctance to provide

84. See, e.g., Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Speech at the Asia Society: Toward the Pacific
Community, American Trade Policy in Asia (Jan. 21, 1999) (transcript available at
http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/barshefsky2.html) (“The work we have underway to address the
trade problems rests on specific U.S. commercial interests. But it also contributes to the broader goal:
the integration of China into an international culture of open economies and the rule of law. Embedded
in our agreements on market access and intellectual property are broader international norms to which
China has committed: transparent laws and regulations; access to administrative or judicial decision
making; curbs on arbitrary exercise of bureaucratic power.”).
85. See, e.g., Testimony of Tom Tauke, Verizon EVP, Senate Commerce Committee Hearing:
Communications, Consumer Choice, and Broadband Act of 2006 5 (May 25, 2006) (transcript available
at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/_files/tauke052506.pdf) (“If enacted, net neutrality regulation will
potentially prohibit us from offering customers the unique and secure platform required for these nextgeneration services. It will potentially prohibit us from offering a competing video service to
consumers. Put another way, radical net neutrality proposals would chill the investment climate for
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symmetric broadband access, which would allow users to upload their own
creative content with the same ease that they download old-time Hollywood
movies, is evidence of their colonizing approach to online interaction.
In fact, although use of the internet is difficult to assess, studies have shown
that end users are most interested in what other end users are doing.86 End users
spend their time reading blogs, posting pictures, sending e-mail, reading about
health issues, chatting, and generally interacting with others. End users are not
(only) passive recipients of “content.” The networked-information economy is
enhancing the autonomy of individuals at the same time that it is allowing them
to do more in loosely organized groups than might be possible through
traditional markets or firms.87 “[T]here has never been a commons as big, robust
and socially creative as the Internet”;88 that valuable commons resources online
remain unowned and uncontrolled is critical.89 To connect with others, to find
groups and affiliations, users are publishing 70,000 new blogs daily, and
updating 700,000 existing blogs.90 Over the last ten years, a wholly decentralized
and global investment of time, money, and gifts has created the indigenous
content of the internet, without the involvement of the network providers.
To ignore indigenous online content while seeking to commoditize it is
likely to be destructive. First, if contributing to this indigenous ecosystem
becomes more difficult because of the nature of the prioritized access valves the
network providers are seeking to control, the ecosystem itself will cease to be as
robust or diverse. The network providers will have destroyed the village while
seeking to make its attractions into a revenue-generating theme park. Second, if
the only indigenous materials that reach subscribers at the speeds necessary for
comfortable viewing are those the network provider finds valuable or those that
can pay for such enhanced passage, the feedback mechanisms that have directed

broadband networks, deter and delay broadband rollout, and lock in today’s internet architecture and
levels of performance.”).
86. See, e.g., PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, HOME BROADBAND ADOPTION 2006 (2006),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Broadband_trends2006.pdf (noting high percentage
of home broadband users—forty-two percent or about thirty-one million people—who have posted
content to the internet; sharing a variety of creations online is among the most popular kinds of usergenerated content. Overall, thirty-six million internet users have shared their own artwork, photos,
stories, or videos on the internet).
87. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2005); Benkler, supra note 78.
88. David Bollier, Reclaiming the Commons, BOSTON REV., Summer 2002, at 8. See generally
DAVID BOLLIER, PUBLIC ASSETS, PRIVATE PROFITS: RECLAIMING THE AMERICAN COMMONS IN AN
AGE OF MARKET ENCLOSURE (2001).
89. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 19–21 (2001). For example, the Internet Commons Congress 2004, held in Silver Spring,
Maryland in March 2004, was described as “[a]n international open assembly of the public, gathered to
address a broad range of issues that threaten the Internet Commons and basic rights to own fullyfunctional computers, to use information rendered to the Commons for the public benefit, and to
develop vibrant new means for working with information.”Id. See generally ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
90. According to Technorati data, there are about 75,000 new blogs a day. Bloggers update their
weblogs regularly; there are about 1.2 million posts daily, or about 50,000 blog updates an hour. About
Technorati, http://technorati.com/about (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).

04__CRAWFORD.DOC

74

8/8/2007 9:18 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 70:51

(if indirectly) the growth of this ecosystem will be crippled.91 Only the network
provider gatekeepers will be deciding what is “worth” seeing and the
indigenous content providers will never learn whether they have an interactive
audience that merits additional investment in their productions. The value of
particular packets is most accurately known only to the originator and recipient
of those packets, not to the intermediary that carries them; endpoints can adjust
to those values in nuanced ways that an intermediary chokepoint cannot.
4. Attempting to Appropriate Social Value
To reward the network providers by permitting them to charge sources of
content for fast passage across their network access points would likely cut off
developments that would benefit society as a whole. Positive externalities, or
“spillovers,”92 representing differences between private returns and social
returns,93 are created every day by internet use. Many of these externalities are
not susceptible to economic valuation. Concrete examples of these spillovers
include a second innovator’s ability to use another innovator’s Application
Program Interface (API) to build an entirely new application using the other
innovator’s data, scientific researchers’ ability to share data for research, or the
ability of a school in North America to do a joint project with a school in Hong
Kong. Similar positive externalities exist for intellectual creations offline as
well, of course.94 The internet’s architecture95 only increases the availability of
these spillovers, many of which will not be “paid for” by anyone, but for which
social demand is high and resulting social benefit will be great.96
As with intellectual property, the question for internet policy is how
thoroughly one private owner should be permitted to extract value from her
creation. In the network neutrality battle, the “creation” is the building of a
broadband access connection. The network providers argue that spillovers
91. The word “cyberspace,” although currently out of fashion, elegantly captures this idea of
indirect shaping based on decentralized feedback. Norbert Weiner coined the word to connote a Greek
steersman who acts as a kind of thermostat—responding to external feedback that triggers changes in
the system. Fundamentally, no one is in charge of the standards and relationships that make up the
internet. No one “steers.” But everyone steers through collective, autonomous feedback, in a constant
loop of reaction and change.
92. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89
MINN. L. REV. 917, 967 (2005) (“Neither the law nor economic efficiency require complete
internalization; external benefits are a ubiquitous boon for society.”). See generally Mark A. Lemley &
Brett M. Frischmann, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).
93. Lemley & Frischmann, supra note 92, at 262.
94. Examples of positive externalities whose benefit is not internalized by the initial author are one
author’s ability to use the germ of an idea she has read in an earlier author’s book or a songwriter’s to
allude to an earlier song or a professor’s to use an excerpt of an article for teaching purposes. See Brett
M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=855244.
95. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001).
96. Frischmann, supra note 92 (explaining that private willingness to pay for or invest in
infrastructural inputs, like information, does not necessarily reflect social demand for outputs); see
generally Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52
DUKE L. J. 1245 (2003) (importance of non-market production of information).
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(uncaptured value in the hands of users) have negative effects on their
incentives to invest in their networks.97 This fits with the traditional view of
internalizing externalities, which suggests that if property owners are made
liable for (and so bear the social cost of) their actions and are entitled to
appropriate the benefits of their property, their interests will align with those of
society and lead them to efficient decisions.98 On this view, spillovers are bad
because they obstruct signals of consumer demand (because no one will be
paying for the spillover) and will not increase the property owner’s incentive to
invest.99
It may be, however, that spillovers in this context are good, not bad.
Spillovers in intellectual endeavors (such as writing, composing, and
researching) drive further innovation. Indeed, industries with significant
spillovers seem to be characterized by more and faster innovation. One
frequently cited example is the tussle between Route 128 innovation and Silicon
Valley innovation. Silicon Valley may have done better because it did not
attempt to lock down and “own” innovation or employees; employees in the
Valley, unlike the Route 128 area, were free to move from company to
company, carrying with them what they had learned.100 Even Alexander Graham
Bell himself did not try to capture the increased “value” of telephony services
experienced by his first subscribers when the second wave of subscribers joined
his network. Instead, he merely charged per additional phone.
The reason for such a difference between private returns and social returns
online is that the current internet’s architecture makes it so easy to generate
these social returns. Because no one needs permission or to pay a special fee to
release a new application online, new applications come into being every single
day.101 To eliminate this entire potential externality surplus by finding a way to
perfectly discriminate through prices would neatly eliminate spillovers and
would, the providers assert, give them the incentives they need to continue

97. See, e.g., Tauke testimony, supra note 85; see also Scott Cleland, NPR commentary, Neutrality:
Congress Debates Internet Fast Lane, June 21, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=5500103 (“Price regulation would destroy any economic incentive to innovate and invest in the
private networks that make up the Internet. Over time, we would end up with a slower Internet and
higher broadband prices and taxes for consumers, less broadband choice and slower broadband
deployment to all Americans.”).
98. Lemley & Frischmann, supra note 92, at 264–68; see also Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser,
Modularity, Vertical Integration and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and
Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 101 (2003) (discussing “internalization of
complementary externalities”).
99. Lemley & Frischmann, supra note 92, at 267–68.
100. Id. at 270 (citing ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, 161–68 (1994); Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal
Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to
Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 577–78 (1999)).
101. Vint Cerf, on behalf of Google, has testified that “[w]e care passionately about the future of the
Net, not just for ourselves, but because of all the other potential Googles out there.” Network
Neutrality: Hearing Before the U.S. Sen. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th
Cong. 3 (Feb. 7, 2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice President and Chief Internet Evangelist,
Google Inc.), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/cerf-020706.pdf.
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building out network connections. But if monetization became the default
setting for internet access, great social costs stemming from overall innovation
losses, loss of access to newly developing forms of interactions without the
wherewithal to pay for speedy carriage, and loss of access to non-monetary
sources of social value would likely be generated that would undoubtedly
exceed the private benefits that the network providers seek to capture.102
It is true that wires used for internet access in concert with the standards and
relationships that make up the internet create unprecedented levels of positive
externalities. This is frustrating for the telcos. While their revenue from phone
service is diminishing and subscribers are replacing their landline phones with
VoIP or wireless phones, the internet’s positive externalities continue to
explode. The telcos would like to internalize these externalities by capturing the
crumbs from this golden loaf of social value, but their ability to lock down
innovation and centralize control, if implemented, is likely to destroy the loaf
itself.103 The deepest pockets are not necessarily the deepest sources of creativity
and invention.
If broadband access is provided on a nondiscriminatory, unbundled basis,
users will have many choices of internet service providers—ISPs—because
competition for both transport and applications will be intense. Japan’s
experience with broadband access makes this clear—particularly when
compared to the Deutsche Telekom story.104 Just as we now know that authors
will create without a strong copyright monopoly in place, we also know from
Japan that broadband access providers will compete even if they cannot charge
whatever they want for passage through their gates.
5. Drawing the Threads Together
Two sets of arguments emerge from this comparison of intellectual property
missteps to communications missteps. First, as in the intellectual property
debate, network provider demands for “incentives” are likely overblown. They
ignore many of the sources of value that make up the internet and privilege the
telco or cableco investment in fiber at the expense of potentially far greater

102. This section is an attempt to answer a recent question posed by Lawrence Lessig to Brett
Frischmann. Because choosing open access or network neutrality will impose costs on the polity or the
market, Lessig suggested that a “clearer sense of the parameters for deciding when open access is a
solution” is needed. Lawrence Lessig, Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1031,
1039 (2005). I respond that specific costs and benefits in this context are unknown and unknowable.
The overall social benefit—the spillovers—of open broadband access connections will be greater than
the private gains from commoditizing these access points, particularly given the significant market
power held by the network providers. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in
Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2064 (2000) (noting “tremendous non-economic
losses—in terms of concentration and commercialization of information production and
homogenization of the information produced—that a perfectly enclosed information environment
imposes on our democracy and our personal autonomy”).
103. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031
(2005).
104. See infra Part IV.
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social gains. Second, the precise reasoning behind the network providers’
demand for incentives is unclear.
As in the intellectual property debate, those arguing the need for incentives
have both ex ante and ex post justifications in mind.105 Broadband access points
take both time and money to create, and (so the argument goes) network
providers need ex ante incentives in order to build them.106 Absent such
incentives, U.S. broadband penetration will remain low. The incentives
argument is an ex ante justification because the goal would be to influence
behavior (the building of an access point) happening before the right to exclude
non-paying content sources from “fast lanes” of access points comes into play.
Ex post justifications, by contrast, operate on the incentives legislative
protection will give network providers to manage network access points that
have already been built. For example, some network providers have argued that
legislative protection is necessary to encourage the network owner to invest in
maintaining the network107 or in preventing congestion on the network.108
Both the ex ante and the ex post justifications are undermined by lack of
information, making them completely untestable. In general, the providers of
broadband access in this country provide little information about how their
networks function, including what kinds of “shaping” activities are already
taking place, the cost of building and maintaining their local loops, and the costeffectiveness of unfettered access. Nor are the numbers that have been supplied
by the broadband providers respecting the past and future costs of installing
fiber broadband access points reliable.
The ex ante explanation creates exclusive control rights in network access
points so as to encourage the builders to create local loops in the first place.109
The providers’ customers for these purposes will include content sources (who
will pay for quick passage across the broadband access points) as well as end
users, (who will presumably pay a flat fee for access). This propertization
incentive will allow the network provider to charge content sources much more
than its marginal costs. As a result, “consumption” of the network access points
by these customers will be artificially lowered. Some content sources who would
have been willing to pay more than the marginal cost (but not much more) for
quick passage, and secondary innovators who wanted to reach such end users
without paying protection money to the network providers’ access points, will
be unable to obtain such transport. End users who want to upload (thus
becoming “content sources” themselves) will be frustrated—thus stifling some
amount of further innovation.

105. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI.
L. REV. 129 (2004) (analyzing the intellectual property incentives debate).
106. For example, DT has threatened not to build fiber access to homes unless it is able to exclude
competitors from them. See infra Part IV.B.
107. See sources cited supra note 97.
108. Yoo, supra note 59.
109. See Lemley, supra note 105 (providing a parallel explanation in the IP setting).
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Moreover, the ex ante incentives sought by the telcos may not have any
particular relationship to their actual building costs.110 Additionally, revenues
reaped from propertizing broadband access will more likely be monetized on
Wall Street rather than put to use building additional broadband connections.
For both of these sets of reasons, even ex ante justifications proferred by the
telcos should be carefully examined.
The ex post justifications have no limiting principles whatsoever. If the
reason for protecting network providers’ control over these access points is to
ensure that the network is well-managed, there is no principled reason to limit
this control in any way—just as in the intellectual property setting.111 This ex
post justification supports any amount of value-extraction by the network
provider—particularly in the absence of genuine market competition for
broadband access points. By the same logic, if the reason for protecting the
network providers’ control over their access points is to avoid congestion or
overuse of the network, all actions of the network provider (even those aimed
at stifling competitive services or redlining particular communities) are
appropriate.
Like those respecting intellectual property “incentives,” these ex post
justifications are “jarringly counterintuitive in a market economy.”112 Network
managers may not be the best improvers of their networks. They may not have
access to the best research or the most creative ways of making these
broadband access points work efficiently. At the least, no empirical evidence
suggests that the current group of network managers is best suited for the job of
improving these networks. Distribution of broadband access may, in fact, be
better accomplished by others.
The ex post justifications are also highly speculative. The telcos can provide
no assurance that price discrimination will improve the network manager’s
return on his investment in broadband deployment. There is no assurance that
granting monopoly discrimination rights based on these ex post justifications
will actually increase broadband penetration or lead to better-maintained
networks. Indeed, granting such rights may lead only to higher prices and lower
supplies of broadband access.
The incentive arguments made by these network providers prove on close
examination to be weak and occasionally internally inconsistent. When a
provider has already built broadband access points (as in the case of Verizon),
why does it need incentives to create them? What assurance do users have that
propertization of these access points will in fact lead to greater investment in
broadband? Why should such propertization not just lead to greater revenues
for the broadband providers? Why would broadband providers who operate

110. For evidence of the general untrustworthiness of the Bells, see Scott Woolley, Shortchanged,
FORBES, May 12, 2003, at 82, available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2003/0512/082_print.html (“The
Baby Bells may have bilked consumers out of billions by inflating the cost of their networks.”).
111. Lemley, supra note 105.
112. Id.
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essentially without market competition necessarily manage their access points
(the goal of the ex post justifications) in ways that would produce desirable
outcomes for society? Finally, why would charging subscribers differentially for
bandwidth usage (but not discriminating against applications or sources of
content) be an unsustainable business model for the network providers?113
Gravel pits are highly remunerative. The real primary incentive for
discrimination (from the network provider point of view) appears to be to
protect existing revenue streams and create new ones.
In sum, “monetization” of broadband access is not, standing by itself, wrong.
What is wrong is that the network providers have market power over access
that has become strategically necessary to the American economy and to an
entire way of life.114 The network providers are not suggesting that anyone have
the power in the future to audit or enforce their progress towards the goals
supposedly served by these incentives. Implicitly, therefore, these incentives
assume the existence of a perfectly competitive market that will enforce these
goals for all of us. Because such a market does not exist, the network providers’
incentive arguments should be examined closely.
IV
COMPARING COUNTRIES
Approaches taken in Japan and in Germany to broadband access regulation
may be instructive for U.S. policy decisions in the coming years. Japan has
chosen to be a strong regulator of telecommunications services, and broadband
penetration and speeds are high in that country. Competition for applications
and services provided over Japan’s unbundled pipes is fierce. Germany, by
contrast, has allowed its incumbent telecommunications company, Deutsche
Telekom, to remain enormously powerful, and has not enforced unbundling
requirements that would have introduced competition for broadband access. As
a result, broadband penetration in Germany remains lower than in many other
European countries, although Germany is the largest of the group in terms of
population and economic heft. DT is now poised to create a fully integrated
“entertainment platform” for its broadband subscribers and is seeking
legislative protection of its network so its offerings to consumers will not be
subject to competition from the internet.

113. See Frischmann, supra note 92, at 925–26 (“This does not mean, however, that access is free.
We pay tolls to access highways, we buy stamps to send letters, we pay telephone companies to route
our calls across their lines, and so on. Users must pay for access to some (though not all) of these
resources. Nor does it mean that access to the resource is unregulated. Transportation of hazardous
substances by highway or mail, for example, is heavily regulated. The key point is that the resource is
openly accessible to all within a community regardless of the identity of the end-user or end-use.”).
This is the essence of common carriage.
114. See Declan McCullagh, Bush: Broadband for the People by 2007, CNET NEWS.COM, Apr. 26,
2004, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-5200196.html.

04__CRAWFORD.DOC

80

8/8/2007 9:18 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 70:51

A. Japan and Broadband
Japan is the first country in the world where broadband and optical fiber
have been made available to individual homes.115 Although U.S. telcos claim
that rolling out fiber is too expensive and that they need regulatory relief and
other incentives to do so, Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (NTT), the
Japanese telco, has done it. At the same time, NTT is required by its regulator
to provide its competitors with access to those fiber networks (to “unbundle its
local loop”).116 As a result of the competition engendered by this unbundling as
well as competition from major electricity companies in Japan, broadband users
in Tokyo are online at speeds that are more than ten times faster than those for
users in New York.117
How has this come about? In a nutshell, NTT began an aggressive fiber
campaign in the early 1990s in order to avoid being broken up by the Japanese
government.118 NTT’s strategy was to show Japan that only a comprehensive
telecommunications company would be strong enough to succeed with fiber,
and that it should therefore remain intact.119 NTT announced in the late 1990s
that it would provide a nationwide fiber network by the end of 2015, and has so
far made substantial progress on this promise.120
At the same time, the Japanese regulator required NTT to open its
networks entirely to its competitors. Of the resulting efficiencies, Kyoto
University economics professor Takanori Ida writes, “Thanks to the policy of
thoroughly open access to NTT’s regional communications networks and
optical fiber, it became possible for newcomers to offer ADSL and FTTH
services without having their own infrastructure.”121 All of NTT’s services were
unbundled at very low costs to its competitors—fiber as well as copper (DSL
and traditional phone line) affordances. Japan has the most open networks of
any country in the world.122
Life for broadband consumers in Japan is good, but life for NTT is difficult.
NTT probably would not have survived the low charges that its regulator
required had it not been for the financial success of its other subsidiaries,
including the strength of its wireless services. NTT has had to lower its prices,

115. GLOBAL BROADBAND BATTLES: WHY THE U.S. AND EUROPE LAG WHILE ASIA LEADS chs.
1–2 (Martin Fransman ed., 2006) [hereinafter GLOBAL BROADBAND BATTLES].
116. Id. at 60. Communications lawyers refer to providing such access as “unbundling the local
loop.” The local loop refers to the “physical twisted metallic pair circuit in the fixed public telephone
network connecting the network termination point at the subscriber’s premises to the main distribution
frame or equivalent facility.” Council Directive 2000/185, preamble ¶ 3, 2000 O.J. (EC).
117. GLOBAL BROADBAND BATTLES, supra note 115, at 59.
118. Id. at 67–68.
119. In 1998–99, NTT was regrouped for management and reporting purposes into three companies:
NTT East, NTT West (both regional phone companies), and NTT DoCoMo. (Japan’s leading cellular
service provider), with a NTT as a holding company controlling all three. See NTT, Corporate Data,
http://www.ntt.co.jp/about_e/corporatedata.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2007).
120. GLOBAL BROADBAND BATTLES, supra note 115, at 68.
121. Id. at 69.
122. Id.
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fire employees, outsource services, cut salaries, and close offices in order to
survive.123 Fierce competition from both DSL providers and electric companies
(who were able to provide fiber networks completely independent of NTT’s
networks) has forced NTT to lower its prices even further.124 NTT’s situation
continues to be difficult, and it may need to dismantle its traditional telephone
network and focus only on optical internet fiber services in the coming years.125
NTT’s profits plunged thirty percent in 2005 as a result of decreased revenue
from traditional telephone subscribers and of low prices for all its other
services.126 NTT cannot leverage its broadband offerings by vertically integrating
services, and it hopes that its costs for providing fiber access will soon come
down to equal its revenues from this service.127 At the same time, it will continue
to be responsible for opening up these networks to its competitors and
providing universal connectivity in Japan.
The results of these events, however, have been astonishing. Japan now has
at least twenty-four million people using broadband, with about two-thirds of
those end users using DSL and the rest fiber connections.128 Japan is ranked
eighth in the world in broadband penetration, and the widespread availability of
broadband in Japan has led to broad use of voice and video services there.129
NTT expects that fiber services will have thirty million subscribers by the end of
2010.130 Japanese prices for fiber broadband access are the lowest in the world,
and speeds are very high.131
B. Germany and Broadband
Germany’s incumbent, DT, controls at least ninety percent of the market for
broadband access in Germany.132 DT’s revenues from this near monopoly,
however, are being undermined by the growth of VoIP services and are

123. Id. at 72.
124. Id. at 71.
125. Id. at 73.
126. Yuri Kageyama, NTT Fiscal 2005 Profit Down 30 Percent, AP BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, May
12, 2006, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D8HI69UO3.htm?campaign_id=apn_tech_
up&chan=tc.
127. Stephen McClelland, 21CN: Japan’s 21st Century Network, TELECOMM. MAG., Mar. 27, 2006,
http://www.telecommagazine.com/search/article.asp?HH_ID=AR_1901.
128. Summary of IDC NOVEMBER 2005 REPORT, http://www.japancorp.net/Article.Asp?
Art_ID=11208; see also Press Release, Computer Industry Almanac, USA Leads Broadband
Subscriber Top 15 Ranking (Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.c-i-a.com/pr1105.htm.
129. U.S. COMMERCIAL SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, JAPAN: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
MARKET BRIEF 2006 (2006), http://www.buyusainfo.net/docs/x_8524808.pdf.
130. Id.
131. THE FIRST MILE: CAPSULE SUMMARIES OF TREND DATA FOR BROADBAND (2006),
http://www.broadbandproperties.com/2006issues/mar06issues/firstmile_march.pdf.
132. GLOBAL BROADBAND BATTLES, supra note 115, at 167 (eighty-eight percent as of end of
2004); see also Deutsche Telekom Reaches 9.2 million DSL Users, On-track for IPTV Launch,
NETWORK
DIGEST,
May
11,
2006,
http://www.convergedigest.com/DSL/
CONVERGE!
lastmilearticle.asp?ID=18212; see also OECD Broadband Statistics, December 2005,
http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,2340,en_2649_34223_36459431_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar.
22, 2007) (10.7 million broadband subscribers in Germany).
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threatened by the model of new fast-growing municipal networks. Both
Amsterdam and Paris are making great strides in laying their own fiber and
avoiding the incumbent telecom operator.133 DT’s responsive tactics are very
similar to those of incumbent U.S. telcos: both seek legislative protection for
complete control over their broadband infrastructure.
In September 2005, DT announced it would be investing $3.9 billion on
installing fiber-to-the-curb (FTTC)—deploying a high-speed optical fiber
network between the operator’s central offices and consumers’ homes in fifty
German cities.134 DT planned to add a million more “triple-play” (integrated
services) customers by the end of 2006.135 DT has announced its intent to remain
Europe’s “number one” telecom operator, and, to retain this status, it is poised
to buy other network operators, including the U.K. incumbent, British
Telecom.136 It also plans to offer a new IPTV service over this new broadband
network in partnership with Microsoft(as a result of a deal Microsoft has
announced is its second biggest ever).137
Potential competitors to DT have long complained that the incumbent has
been very slow to grant access to the local loop and has imposed “excessive colocation conditions” and “excessive licensing fees” for this access.138 Although
unbundling has been required by the German regulator since 1998, DT has

133. DAMIEN CHEW, ING WHOLESALE BANKING, EUROPEAN TELECOMS: CITYNET
AMSTERDAM: FIBRE-TO-THE-HOME IS BECOMING A REALITY (2006), http://www.ftthcouncil.org/
documents/736808.pdf; Paris Plans FTTH Network, LIGHTREADING.COM, Jan. 9, 2006,
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=86547.
134. DT Flings Billions at Fiber Access, LIGHTREADING.COM, Sept. 1, 2005,
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=79944. The remaining distance to homes will be
covered by VDSL links, providing speeds of up to fifty Mbps. John Blau, Deutsche Telekom to Begin
IPTV Test in May, NETWORK WORLD NEWS, Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.networkworld.com/news/
2006/042806-deutsche-telekom-to-begin-iptv.html.
135. DT, TI Set to Spend Big on Broadband, LIGHTREADING.COM, Nov. 9, 2005,
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=83983.
136. DT Plans Acquisitions, LIGHTREADING.Com, May 4, 2006, http://www.lightreading.com/
document.asp?doc_id=94066; Would DT Buy BT?, LIGHTREADING.COM, May 26, 2006,
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=95818.
137. Microsoft Wins IPTV Deal at DT, LIGHTREADING.COM, Mar. 21, 2006,
http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=91180. MSN is also providing IPTV platforms to
BT, Telecom Italia, Swisscom, the new combined AT&T entity, and Alcatel. Id. Deutsche Telekom’s
T-Online division will offer a triple-play data, voice, and video service in Germany, France, and Spain
called T-Home that will be based on Microsoft IPTV software and set-top boxes provided by Cisco. DT
Launching Home Triple-Play Broadband, UPI, Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.upi.com/HiTech/view.php?StoryID=20060428-052533-1063r.
138. OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, BACKGROUND ON THE 2001
SECTION 1377 REVIEW (2001), http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2001/April/
Background_on_the_2001_Section_1377_Review.html. The review notes that DT practices hinder
entry by competitors and are in derogation of World Trade Organization commitments by Germany:
“Under Section 1377 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 the USTR annually
reviews, by March 31 of each year, the operation and effectiveness of U.S. telecommunications trade
agreements, and takes action where noncompliance is found. In most cases related to implementation
of WTO commitments under the 1998 Basic Telecommunications Agreement, the annual Section 1377
review process has led governments and regulators to take immediate steps to address the complaints
of U.S. carriers.”
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succeeded in keeping its competitors “relative[ly] insignificant.”139 It has also
required that anyone buying a DSL connection for broadband internet access
(which could include use of VoIP services) also buy a landline phone line from
DT.140
Broadband penetration in Germany is surprisingly low: Germany is ranked
tenth in Europe and eighteenth out of OECD countries as of December 2005.141
Although more than sixty percent of Germans are online,142 only thirteen out of
every 100 inhabitants subscribe to broadband services, compared to 16.8 in the
United States and 25.4 in Iceland.143 Nearly ninety-five percent of those
subscribers use DSL connections; cable broadband has no real presence in
Germany, although cable penetration itself is very high.144 And DT’s ISP (TOnline) has an “extraordinarily strong market position” in DSL, with very few
competitors.145 Germany has already fallen behind in the market for innovation
in online music and voice services, and is unlikely to be a source of innovation
in video applications.146
In February 2006, the partially state-owned DT urged the German
government to pass a law that would protect DT’s new fiber network from
access requirements.147 Under this approach, Germany’s Federal Network

139. GLOBAL BROADBAND BATTLES, supra note 115, at 167. U.S. telecommunications trade
associations in the past filed complaints with USTR (for example, in February 1999, 2000, and 2001)
under Section 1377 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, charging that Germany
was not fully complying with the WTO’s Basic Telecommunications Agreement. See BUREAU OF
ECON. & BUS. AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2001 COUNTRY REPORT ON ECONOMIC POLICY AND
TRADE PRACTICES (2002), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/8224.pdf.
140. German Innovation Stalled at Home, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Dec. 13, 2004, http://www.dwworld.de/dw/article/0,2144,1427206,00.html.
141. Press Release, ECTA, Broadband Study Highlights Two-Speed Europe (May 2006),
http://www.ectaportal.com/en/upload/File/Broadband%20Scorecards/Q405/Final3%20Press%20Releas
e%20Sc%20Q4051.pdf; OECD Broadband Statistics, supra note 132.
142. Internet World Stats, Germany, http://www.internetworldstats.com/eu/de.htm (last visited Mar.
22, 2007).
143. OECD Broadband Statistics, supra note 132 (total of 10.7 million broadband subscribers).
144. GLOBAL BROADBAND BATTLES, supra note 115, at 195. GLOBAL BROADBAND BATTLES
suggests that the reason for this is the complicated state-level system of regulation of cable content. Id.
at 204.
145. Id. at 197. DT has 9.2 million broadband customers in Germany, out of a total of 10.7 million
broadband subscribers in that country. OECD Broadband Statistics, supra note 132.
146. German Innovation Stalled at Home, supra note 140 (“Experts fear a repeat of the MP3 fiasco,
the technology for which was also developed in Germany, although German firms did not develop
lucrative business applications for it. Similar resistance to digital music means that most Germans who
buy and download music online use foreign services, like iTunes, with German online music platforms
struggling to catch up.”); see also The Alarm Clock, http://www.thealarmclock.com/euro/archives/2006/
02/best_exits_foreuro_vcs_were_i.html (Feb. 1, 2006, 06:50) (“Europe’s largest economy has been the
region’s largest disappointment for venture capital investors, according to the buzz at VC and tech
conferences over here.”). An examination of the pace of online innovation in Germany is beyond the
scope of this article, but early signs have not been encouraging thus far.
147. The German government still owns 15.2% of DT, and a German-government-owned bank
owns another 17.3% of the company—the largest shareholders in DT. John Blau, Blackstone Buys $3.3
Billion Stake in Deutsche Telekom, IDG NEWS SERV., Apr. 24, 2006, available at
http://www.itworld.com/Tech/2428/060424blackstone/. The German government therefore is likely very
sensitive to fluctuations in the company’s fortunes.
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Agency would be allowed to intervene only if, in the absence of regulation,
competition in a “new market” was likely to be inhibited “in the long term.”148
DT threatened not to build this network unless it received the protection it
sought, and the German government agreed to help.149
The European Union’s New Regulatory Framework requires that
broadband providers with significant market power be subject to a range of
obligations, including transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation,
access, and price controls.150 In particular, where an operator is found to have
significant market power, the regulator must “provide[] services and
information to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as it
provides for its own services, or those of its subsidiaries or partners.” 151 In May
2006, when the German government approved the draft bill for the European
Parliament that would have exempted DT from being forced to unbundle its
$3.9-billion broadband network, the European Commission responded by
threatening legal action against Germany.152 An EC commissioner for
information society and media said, “We cannot afford to create new
monopolies out of short-term political opportunism.”153 A DT spokesman
responded that it “cannot possibly invest [$3.9 billion] in setting up a network
without receiving adequate protection for our investment in return.”154 DT and
its friends in the German government take the view that “new and emerging
markets in which market power may be found to exist because of ‘first-mover’
advantages, should not in principle be subject to ex-ante regulation.”155
Beginning in mid-June 2006, DT plans to offer consumers a package that
they will access through a proprietary media receiver manufactured by Linksys,
a division of Cisco.156 Consumers will be offered about 100 channels, including
existing satellite and cable feeds, and video-on-demand movies.157 This MSN
platform will also offer web surfing, VoIP, and “other interactive entertainment

148. Deutsche Telekom Competitors Up in Arms at Regulatory Hiatus Option for VDSL Network,
HEISE ONLINE NEWS, May 18, 2006, http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/73290.
149. EU Threatens Sanctions Over Protection Request by Telekom, DEUTSCHE WELLE, Mar. 13,
2006, http://www.dw- world.de/dw/article/0,2144,1933722,00.html (“I am not talking about monopolist
profits,” [DT CEO] Ricke said. “We simply want to be able to determine our own destiny in a new
market. We need clear legal commitments regarding the long-term regulatory situation if we are to roll
out this (VDSL) project.”).
150. Council Directive 2002/19, preamble, 2002 O.J. (EC).
151. Id. arts. 8, 10.
152. EU Renews Legal Threat over German Broadband, INT’L HERALD TRIB., May 17, 2006,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/17/business/techbrief.php.
153. Id.
154. EU Commissioner: No Regulatory Compliance Exception for DT’s Optical Fiber Networks,
HEISE ONLINE NEWS, Feb. 20, 2006, http://www.heise.de/english/newsticker/news/69849.
155. Id.
156. John Blau, Deutsche Telekom to Begin IPTV Test in May, NETWORK WORLD NEWS, Apr. 28,
2006, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/042806-deutsche-telekom-to-begin-iptv.html; DT Rival
Launches IPTV, LIGHTREADING.COM, May 12, 2006, http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?
doc_id=94671.
157. DT Rival Launches IPTV, supra note 156.
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services.”158 DT’s vision, like that of other telcos around the world, is that this
integrated IP-based platform combining information, communication, and
entertainment (ICE) will prove irresistible to consumers.159 It will allow for
differentiation of services because DT will be able to use the packet-inspection
capabilities of Cisco’s routers to ensure that the capacity of this broadband
connection will be dedicated to DT’s partners’ content. DT is well on the way to
being able to fully leverage its network operator status into becoming a
gatekeeper over all broadband interactions in the areas it serves.
V
COMPARING COMPARISONS
The arguments in favor of “integrated IP” networks made by the U.S.
network providers and the arguments made by intellectual property maximalists
have much in common. They also differ in key respects.
Consider the similarities. U.S. network providers are moving to erase
traditional concerns over the monopolization of access that have shaped
communications law since the days of the railroads, just as intellectual property
maximalists have tried to erase traditional concerns over the monopolization of
creative work that have shaped intellectual property law since the Statute of
Anne. Both groups are deeply threatened by the digitization of all content—
whether the content is a telephone call or a first-run movie. Both groups have
longstanding business models that have relied on customary physical friction in
the analog world—for the telcos, the difficulty of making a telephone call
without a telephone system, and for the IP maximalists, the difficulty of copying
a work inexpensively. Both the network providers and the IP maximalists (using
DRM) would like to have perfect price discrimination respecting access to their
digital “products.”160 Perfect price discrimination requires perfect control, and so
both groups have sought legal and technical assistance to establish and maintain
such control.
Consider the differences in both timing and available alliances. This fight
over network neutrality is like the fight that took place just before the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)161 was enacted, when the copyright
industry was seeking legal protection to prevent digital technologies from

158. Id.
159. See David Russell, The Road to Convergence: Network Transformation and IP, CONVERGE!
NETWORK DIG., May 17, 2006, http://www.convergedigest.com/bp-ttp/bp1.asp?ID=355&ctgy=Loop.
The author explains the origin of ICE thusly: “Going forward, successful operators will be ICE
operators, providing information, communication, and entertainment services to subscribers. To deliver
ICE services uniformly and cost effectively, providers must transform their networks and their business
models, encompassing entirely new lines of business.”
160. See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1106–07 (2003); Julie E.
Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (noting the encryption found
on DVD players that enables geographic price discrimination); Pamela Samuelson, DRM [and, or, vs.]
the Law, COMM. ACM, Apr. 2003, at 41.
161. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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eroding their exclusive rights. The telcos are now seeking legal protection for a
new role as cable operators: content providers, gatekeepers, and salesmen for
walled gardens. Unlike the pre-DMCA days, when few people were paying
attention to the problem of locking up distribution of digital content—and those
people were inadequately funded to contest the copyright owners’ claims—
there are now strong collective forces already on the side of an open, neutral
internet. These forces include the many entities and individuals who have
elected to join the grassroots savetheinternet.com effort,162 as well as substantial
online companies and innovators whose business models depend on the
provision of a neutral online substrate.
Unlike in the intellectual property law context, in which the DMCA
incorporated a strong liability protection for online businesses,163 the new antinetwork neutrality telecom bills contain no tradeoffs to assist the online
businesses. And unlike the intellectual property wars, which seemed to have
been between only private parties, open communications networks have served
us well in the past and have correspondingly been a strong governmental
priority. Finally, unlike the copyright context, in which the old laws were being
fiercely protected by incumbents (who had been granted extraordinarily strong
if usually unenforceable exclusive rights), the network providers are trying to
use accommodations granted to the cable companies in Brand X to throw
traditional common carriage regulatory structures covering public networks out
the window. Their arguments are for a change in the status quo, rather than for
legal arrangements that will ensure continuation of the status quo (arguably the
claim behind the DMCA anti-circumvention provisions).
A key element that separates the intellectual property battles from the
telecom battles in the United States is that during the early days of the
copyright disputes, international models were unavailable for comparison, and
the United States was not racing with other countries to create the most
economically valuable copyright policy. Now, however, the telecommunications
issues under discussion in the United States have informative international
parallels.
In Japan, competition for broadband access—and concomitant low prices
and high speeds—will erupt when incumbents are forced to unbundle their
broadband facilities. This unbundling will make life economically difficult for
network providers, as it has for NTT. If we adopt a wholesale separation regime
for telecommunications providers, we can arrange for ways to make them
whole.164 Because “unbundling” has proven not to work in the United States
162. Save the Internet: Fighting for Internet Freedom, http://www.savetheinternet.com/ (last visited
Mar. 22, 2007).
163. Safe harbors were provided to online service providers who took adequate steps to remove
material that was infringing copyrights.
164. There is a strong argument in favor of exercising eminent domain, and paying compensation,
rather than regulating around a taking in this context. It is difficult to say empirically whether the gains
of a regulatory taking would exceed the private harms suffered by the network owners. It would be
very difficult to write down in words what discriminations were unlawful by a particular network
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(prompting litigation and lobbying but few consumer benefits), “quarantine”
will be needed.165
Germany’s incumbents want to reserve any excess capacity in their
broadband connections for their own prioritized content and are not
particularly concerned about what this will do to “the internet.” This approach
will keep consumers moving online slowly, behaving like passive absorbers of
cable-like content rather than producing their own material.
Finally, what we hear from Germany as well as from our own incumbents
signals the network operators’ plan to gradually diminish the importance of
“the internet” to the public. The operators have always been unhappy with the
popularity of the internet and the ease with which their communications
services have been commodified, and they are desperate to displace it.
Although DT has more control over the market for broadband access in
Germany than U.S. incumbents do, this is a difference of degree rather than

provider, given the providers’ propensity to label everything they do as legitimate “network
management.” Litigation over whether any rate-setting regulation was a taking would take years and
would be enormously expensive, given the almost limitless resources of the telcos to fight for their
franchises. It might be wiser to simply perform an actual compensated taking, forcing the network
providers to cease providing prioritized content or do more than provide unbundled transport services
that are open to interconnection. The expense would be great, but the arguments would be over. There
are analogies available in other fields. For example, in 1992 a FERC Order (No. 636, known generally
as the Open Access Order) mandated pipeline unbundling, requiring pipelines to sell transportation
separately from other services. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., FERC ORDER 636: THE RESTRUCTURING
RULE
(1992),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/ngmajorleg/ferc
636.html. Order 636 meant that the transport pipelines could no longer engage in gas sales or sell any
product as a bundled service. See id. Thus, no advantages in terms of (among other things) the timing of
gas transportation could be afforded by a pipeline to its affiliates. This set of actions has generally
benefited gas customers. It was expensive to achieve: FERC recognized that pipeline companies would
incur costs as a result of complying with Order 636, and allowed them to charge customers for them.
The initial plan was to allow pipeline companies to charge exit fees and surcharges to recover 100% of
their “prudently incurred” transition costs between the bundled and unbundled regimes; later, FERC
issued Order 636-A on August 3, 1992, which required pipeline companies to recover ten percent of
these transition costs through the rates they charged for gas transportation. These costs included
“realignment costs” for changing gas supply contracts, “stranded costs” for assets used to provide
bundled products, costs incurred to purchase new equipment, and other costs. Id. Concededly, having
the FCC work on such a “prudently incurred” cost-assessment regime will take a great deal of time and
may be very expensive. But the cost will serve a higher public value.
165. The 1996 Act directed incumbent local telephony carriers to unbundle parts of their networks
for lease to providers of competitive local exchange services at cost-based prices. Mandated unbundling
under the Act is widely viewed to have been a failure. Since the Act came into force ten years ago, the
FCC has been mired in litigation over what precisely their unbundling rules are—which elements have
to be unbundled, and at what prices. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (vacating and
remanding key unbundling rules from Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 45,476 (Aug. 29, 1996) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 20,
51, 90)); United States Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding the FCC’s
new network elements rules, announced at Revision of the Commission’s Rules Specifying the Portions
of the Nation’s Local Telephone Networks That Incumbent Local Telephone Companies Must Make
Available to Competitors, 65 Fed. Reg. 2367 (Jan. 14, 2000) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51), and its new
rules for sharing the local loop, announced in Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 65 Fed. Reg. 1331 (Jan. 10, 2000) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51));
Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52276 (Sept. 2, 2003) (codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 51) (“Final Order”) (setting out more rules).
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kind. In reality, consumers here have no more than one or two choices of
providers.
The German view, one centered on the ideal of the romantic builder, will
tend to disproportionately favor the contributions of the network provider—
their streaming, big-media productions (rather than the file transfers and local
storage embraced by end users) and their preference for downloading over
uploading. The internet’s astonishing resources and its overwhelming efficiency
in using many eyes and hands to create value, will therefore eventually,
inevitably, diminish rather than grow. The distributional, environmental, and
innovation-related effects of this trend will be profound.
These comparative examples show that the incentives arguments of U.S.
incumbents are overblown. Competition, rather than legislative protection,
provides incentives to lower costs and improve networks; the “romantic
builder” is actually a holdup artist with substantial market power; and the
network providers seek to replace “the internet” with a privatized network that
they can control.166 More important, however, is that complete control of
strategically key network access points, as in Japan, is inappropriate. The access
points are still “owned,” privately, by NTT. But NTT has a duty to open them
to all comers so as to further Japan’s overall plan to bring broadband access to
the interactive internet to its citizens.
The intellectual property debates suggest that in the context of the
telecommunications fracas the network operators would create too many
property rights that would reward the wrong people and that these incumbents
would undermine and undervalue the societal spillovers made possible by the
internet. The Japanese examples also show that incentives to build networks
may come from competition rather than legislation, just as authors will continue
to write even without a copyright monopoly at the forefront of their minds.
VI
CONCLUSION
In the United States, we have an opportunity to take positive action on this
question. Imposing duties on broadband access providers to serve all other
access providers alike (by requiring them to separate their transport services
from their “content” services) could create enormous public benefits. It is not
wrong to own an access point to the internet. What is wrong is to act as a
holdup artist—to require that a portion of all value stemming from use of the
network, however created, be paid to the owner. Requiring the duty to serve
other access providers would make possible a network that would be far more
valuable than one that would be created by giving these particular access-point

166. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 2040 (2006). The
author envisions this possible future: “Two Internets would consign the existing grid to an appliancized
fate, in which little new happens as existing technology players incrementally modify existing
applications without the competitive pressure of grid-enabled innovation arbitrage.”
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owners the incentives they now seek on Capitol Hill. Just as intellectual
property law is designed to serve the public interest through key limitations on
an “owner’s” ability to extract value from his or her work, so should these
broadband access networks be subject to common carriage obligations to
further competition, innovation, and other central social goals.
We have time to consider the question of network control. Control over
distribution chokepoints—prioritization of particular packets—is not inevitable.
It is possible to imagine (in Japan, it exists) an alternative future for the
internet: blazing high speeds brought about by competition, no prioritization or
discrimination, and the emergence of new applications taking advantage of the
open internet substrate.
Now, however, the goals of U.S. communications law are not clear. Even
though the bills now being considered by Congress will fundamentally affect
our economy and society, we have not decided what is important to us. In a
sense, we are faced with a narrow question: What policies should apply to the
“last mile” broadband access point? Should it be nondiscriminatory or vertically
integrated with a carrier’s other offerings?
Answering this question poses three options: (1) We can relax into the
property talk and “romantic builder” notion being conveyed by the carriers and
believe that legislative incentives to invest in the carriers’ networks will lead to
overall benefits for mankind. (2) We can attempt to draft a network neutrality
rule that calls upon carriers to treat “similar” services similarly, then founder on
the rocky shoals of trying to determine which flow of amplifying bits is “similar”
to another (imagine the deep packet inspection that will be required to make
that assessment possible). Or (3) we can recognize that the value of access to
the internet carries with it a duty to be open to all comers—particularly given
the very few choices of network providers in this country. As to this third
option, we can decide together whether the internet’s value to people will be
better served by requiring a common carriage duty, with appropriate
compensation to the carriers. This will not be an easy discussion, and scholarly
assistance is needed.
When scholars confront copyright questions, they address—directly—what
benefits copyright law is supposed to bring to all people. The copyright
maximalists scarcely recognized the importance of encouraging second-in-time
innovators and peer creations, but scholars took on these issues with vigor. The
current communications-law discussion does not adequately take into account
the interactive, user-generated nature of the internet nor the benefits that open
access to this resource has generated and will continue to generate for
humanity. In the broadband context, other countries—in particular, Japan—
seem to have found ways to keep broadband access points open, competitive,
fast, and inexpensive. We should learn from the copyright debates and from the
comparative broadband deployment stories available to us and do the same. As
James Boyle might have said if he were writing about telecommunications
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instead of intellectual property law, we are at risk of being in thrall to an idea of
romantic network ownership that should be questioned as dogma.

